Christian Prudence,

OR,

Directions

FOR THE

Guidance and Conduct of our Selves,

In the Case of

Judging one another.

Being several Discourses on

MATTH. 7. 1.

Judge not, that you be not judged.

By *G. Bright*, late Dean of St. *Asaph*, Rector of *Loughborough*, and Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty.

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
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The PREFACE.

Good Reader,

THe Reaſon in very ſhort why this ſmall Treatiſe is Publiſhed is, becauſe it was judged, that there would likely ſome more Good come of it than of not doing it, and this again becauſe the Matter therein contained was thought true, and in ſome conſiderable degree uſeful and profitable, and not yet either ſo particularly, or in ſuch Method and Manner diſcourſed by any other as to render this Diſcourſe ſuperfluous.

The firſt of theſe is but too little regarded eſpecially in Practical Matters, where Men attending principally to the Practice of them, do leſs mind the preciſe and exact Truth, and therefore whether they are not (as commonly they are) too unlimitedly and generally affirmed. Beſides Men commonly receive Practical things and what is taught concerning their Duty with more general

Veneration, which makes them more eaſily and preſently to attribute to them the perfection of Truth, or to judg them true. Men are apt too to ſuſpect themſelves of ſome unwillingneſs to do, and conſequently to know their duty, when they queſtion and examine whether it be truly ſo or no; and that this ſticking and doubting proceeds from thence, which indeed is too often true, whence it comes to paſs that Men are generally more careleſs and ſecure concerning the truth of theſe Matters when they deliver them, and many hurtful miſtakes are conveyed with ſome profitable truths.

As for the profitableneſs of the Argument, and what is diſcourſed thereupon, I know it will be variouſly judged according to Mens various inclinations or informations. Men judg things profitable, either becauſe they will, it pleaſeth them to judg ſo, or becauſe they ſee and perceive them to be ſo; that is becauſe they perceive and apprehend the good effects thereof, the one commonly is called the Judgment

of

of affection (becauſe our inclinations are uſually from Affection) the other the judgment of Reaſon; both may be in ſeveral, nay in the ſame Men various enough. The firſt is the moſt inconſtant and diverſe, but the ſecond is ſo too according to Mens various informations or apprehenſions from Reaſon or Experience; one Man may have obſerved and remembred many excellent effects or uſes of any certain thing, another very few, or none, or bad ones only, whence one judgeth it very profitable, another very little ſo, or not at all, or bad and hurtful, and yet both may judg prudently and truly, if it be only of what appears to them: I leave every one freely to their own Reaſon and Obſervation in this particular, only I ſuggeſt that they would not exclude their future information, that they would not judg only according to what they have heretofore; but alſo according to what they may hereafter obſerve themſelves, or learn from others. The miſcarriages in judging one another are ſo univerſal among the common ſort of Chriſtians,

and ſo frequent and little regarded even in wiſer and better diſpoſed, and yet ſo very miſchievous, as may be partly underſtood from one part of this Diſcourſe, that it is to be preſumed the miſchievous effects thereof have not been hitherto ſo much taken notice of and reſented, as they ſeem to have deſerved in compare with other Matters. We ſee Men every day eagerly and fiercely and even to Perſecution to contend concerning the uſefulneſs and truth of their knowledg and judgment in other Opinions Religious, Secular, Divine and Humane, which would put very knowing but unprejudiced Men to much ſtudy to find out any good uſe or effect thereof, more than oft-times the pleaſure of meer knowing ſome-what though very uſeleſs, confuſedly, or only conceited ſome great matter by them; when in the mean time they are utterly careleſs of their knowledg and judgment of one another, whence it is manifeſt they are preſently affected with mutual eſteem and love, or with contempt and hatred, are Friends or Enemies,

mies, and consequently effectually disposed to be negligent of at least, or to do good or mischief to one another, and consequently to hinder or help what they are good for in the World, and who knows where the Good or Evil may stop? I hope it will not be the less useful and truly valuable for being that which is truly Moral Knowledg: For that being only the knowledg of our Manners, that is, the habitual inclination of our Wills, Choices, and active Faculties, what should be perpetually their ultimate Object or their End, which can be but one, *viz.* The greatest perfection and happiness of the whole Universe known to us taking in God himself, what the intermediate ones or means; in what degree they are to be proportioned. The Knowledg of the one true and right end and just measure of all our habitual Inclinations and Actions, I say, Moral Knowledg being this, it is manifest there is no other Knowledg we are capable of comparable for its good use and effect, and consequently much to be valued, separated there-

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there-from, or conſidered not ſubſervient or inſtrumental thereto.

For by it alone we are directed to the obtainment of that perfection, by which we tend to do any good to others, or which keeps from doing any harm, the fruit or good effect of other Knowledg conſidered alone is chiefly the pleaſure and delight immediately ariſing to the Mind, and is confined within our ſelves. Good Morality in this ſenſe is the greateſt perfection our Natures are capable of, being nothing but the univerſal right determination of our Wills and Choices to the beſt and moſt excellent end, *viz.* The greateſt Perfection and Happineſs of the whole Univerſe, taking in God himſelf: It is nothing but Univerſal Goodneſs, it tends to an infinite good without our ſelves, and therefore no wonder that the poſſeſſion and exerciſe of it in ſincerity and vigour fills the Soul with the greateſt delight and ſatisfaction. All other things in the World may be uſed well or ill, and ſeem to be equally capable of both, and therefore indifferent; this only cannot be the cauſe

cauſe of any thing but good in the World, nor can it be conceived that any thing elſe ſhould render us capable of reward from God, that is, of any Happineſs or Perfection, but at leaſt a Will to do all the Good with it that it is uſable for. For why ſhould we have either, if we do no Good, or do Miſchief therewith? But if this Morality be the moſt excellent thing we are capable of: Then ſure is its Knowledg.

Some have valued and prized Knowledg by other Characters than Uſefulneſs and good Effects; ſuch as is its being by Revelation or inſpired: And therefore have thought every Truth and the leaſt revealed to be of greater concernment or worth more than the greateſt known by reaſon or natural Light, eſpecially if not revealed too; not attending that the Reaſon of Revelation is not only the utility of a truth (though there is always ſufficient) but the difficulty of its being otherwiſe known.

Much more might have been ſuggeſted in ſo conſiderable a Matter: But this is enough if not too much in this place.

Laſtly

Laſtly, As for this Diſcourſe's not being ſuperfluous, I ſhould be glad to be miſtaken, and that this Argument hath been ſo Handled and Treated of already as to render this uſeleſs.

I ſhall give thee no further trouble (Good Reader) but only deſire that thou wouldſt read this Treatiſe (if thou thinkeſt fit to read at all) with the ſame deſign it was Compoſed, *viz.* Of Guidance and Conduct of our ſelves in this particular, and conſequently that it might contribute ſome-thing to the increaſe of univerſal Charity, Juſtice, and Wiſdom in the World.

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ſolve

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Fol-

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19	2	And readiness,	and a little readiness.
ib.	11	Dele and.	
ib.	19	Contrary to the, &c.	contrary to it, the.
33	14	Judgment: This rash	Judgment. This &c.
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ib.	19	Those out of, &c.	Those. Out of, &c.
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60	5	Our selves so to do;	Our selves, so to do;
ib.	13	Pleasures,	Pleasure.
62	7	It is so: In, &c.	It is so. In, &c.
63	2	To be an excellent,	To be in an excellent.
73	19	(For Christ)	(For Example.)
75	15	Looks,	Books.
98	8	Encreased,	Increased.
ib.	27	(which obtains in Inanimate things but principally in &c.	(which may be to Inanimate things, but principally to, &c.
99	9	Many or all, perhaps	Many or all perhaps,
104	7	By bringing into our Minds not only what	Not only bringing into our minds what.
106	26	And favour; nay, &c.	And favour. Nay
117	12	More then in thine,	More in thine, &c.
122	14	is,	are.
124	17	במילא,	במכילא.
ib.	22	מיקילא,	מיכילא.
129	17	To bad, &c.	Too bad, &c.
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A TREATISE CONCERNING Judging one another.

CHAP. I.

Mat. 7. 1.

Judg not that you be not Judged.

A Very good Commendation of any Argument or Subject of Diſcourſe, is its Uſefulneſs for the Prevention of very Miſchievous and Hurtful Effects and Conſequences: Such is this of Mens paſſing Judgment concerning other Mens Qua-

lities and Actions, the Principles and Effects of them. The too great Proneneſs, Readineſs and Frequency of doing it, and that on the bad ſide, to Suſpect, Accuſe and Condemn, and this moſt-what raſhly, that is, without Reaſon, Uncertainly, often Falſly. Nay, not being content with this, on all Occaſions without any Reaſon or Cauſe but Self-love, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Flattery, Curioſity, Buſibodineſs, or the like, to make it known and declare it to others. Whereby they diſpoſe themſelves to be Unjuſt and Uncharitable to others, and hardly to like any Body but themſelves, or thoſe that are like themſelves, or ſome way or other Uſeful and Profitable to them, that is, themſelves in others. And as much do they diſpoſe others by this their Behaviour and Temper, both by way of Imitation and Revenge, or Self-defence, at leaſt to behave themſelves in like manner to them, and to pay them in their own Coyn. Men hereby too, growing Strangers to themſelves, and being buſier in other Mens Tempers and

and Actions than their own, are taken up in mending in others that which is not Faulty, or they can leſs mend if it be: While they neglect themſelves where it may be more to be mended, and where they can better do it.

A Vice or Fault, this ſeems too Extraordinary frequent. For what more frequently comes into our thoughts and Diſcourſes at all times, than other mens Perſons, and conſequently their Qualities and Actions. All our Behaviour to one another, to all ſorts of Perſons, ſuppoſeth and followeth our Judgments we make one of another; which are very rarely exactly true, and ſincerely Charitable; but moſt-what altogether raſh and prejudiced by Self-love, and conſequent Paſſions, or blended and mixed. Few Men alſo employ themſelves in Judging, or Diſcourſing of things appertaining to Perſons abſtracted from Perſons, becauſe they are not accompanied with a ſenſible Subject; which with what appertains thereto, they beſt apprehend and conceive: And for the ſame Reaſon among others, the

Perſons are others, not themſelves, they moſt frequently occurring to their Senſes. Men ſeldomer ſee themſelves in their Glaſſes, than others directly with their Eyes: And then they being great, but as fooliſh and unreaſonable Self-lovers, are not only willing therefore to have nothing Faulty, Bad, or Imperfect in themſelves, which is well: But alſo not to ſee it, and then they judg they really have none; when they have as many, or more, and greater than others; which is fooliſh and bad. Bad, becauſe it proceeds from ultimate Self-love: Fooliſh, becauſe the miſtake through Self-flattery, is very Hurtful and Miſchievous to themſelves, whom they ſo much love. For hereby they deprive themſelves of the greateſt good, that is of becoming univerſally Good and Vertuous; while they overlook what is amiſs in themſelves, and ſee it not at all; or if they do, they take it for ſomething that is Vertuous and Commendable, or much more ſo than it is. Nor is this Fault or Vice, only to be ſeen in ordinary Perſons: But is alſo very

very general to all ſorts, even to thoſe who have had the Opportunity of the beſt inſtructed Education. Witneſs Books and Writings, where oft-times Men proclaim aloud, and leave upon Record; and this moſt willingly, raſhly, fooliſhly, out of Pride, Envy, Revenge, Contempt, the Ignorance, the Folly and Miſtake, the Raſhneſs, Falſhood, Knavery, Hypocriſie, Obſtinacy of one another. This is that which our Saviour here Warns and Adviſeth againſt in this long and Excellent Diſcourſe of his, both to his Diſciples and a multitude of People, who were gathered together from all the Countrey about, to ſee and hear what he did and ſaid: And it ſeems they heard ſo much, as put them into great Wonder and Aſtoniſhment. Both in reſpect it is like of the Excellent Matter of his Preaching and Diſcourſe, being more Moral and Spiritual than that of the *Phariſees* and their *Scribes* and *Doctors* was, who moſt-what read them Lectures of tithing *Mint* and *Gummin*, and the minute ſmall Matters of their Law:

And then in reſpect of his manner of Speaking, which was with more Authority: That is, ſo as to move them more to mind and believe the things he ſaid, and that (among other Ways) by ſpeaking them ſo, as if he moſt certainly knew the Truth and Concernment of what he ſpake; they on the Contrary, it may be, only probably, uncertainly, dubiouſly and coldly, reaſoning about their ſmall Queſtions.

In treating of this Argument, the Summ or Contents of our Diſcourſe ſhall be theſe;

I. Only juſt to mention the true Senſe of the word here uſed, to Judg, or κρίνω.

II. The Judgment here forbidden, ſhall be more particularly explicated.

III. What Judgment here is not forbidden, though in danger of being taken for that which is.

IV. Whence this forbidden Judgment here proceeds, what are the Cauſes.

V. The miſchievous Effects or Conſequences hereof, which will be ſo many

ny Reaſons too, why we ſhould not be guilty of it.

VI. The Remedies to prevent or mend it.

VII. How we ſhould govern our Judgments of Perſons, both concerning their Vertues and Vices.

Sect. I.

I. For the Firſt. The word κρίνω here rendred to Judg, hath ſeveral Significations in Scripture.

1. In General to paſs Judgment, that is, to affirm or deny, any Propoſition or Sentence thought of. This is the moſt ordinary Senſe, and every where occurs, 1 *Cor.* 11. 13. *Judg in your ſelves,* [ἐν ὑμῖν αυτοῖς κρίνατε.] *Is it comely for a Woman to Pray with her Head uncovered.* And the ſame in 1 *Cor.* 10. 15. *I ſpeak as to Wiſe-Men, Judg you what I ſay:* i. e. Paſs your Judgment, give your Opinion after Conſideration, of what I am now about to propoſe unto you: And where this word Κρίνω is thus uſed in the Septu-

agints Translation of the Old Testament, it may Answer to the *Hebrew* words אמר חשב, and other words.

2. More particularly, To pass Judgment concerning the Actions or Qualities of a Person, either of his Vertues or Faults, Good or Bad: And this is as often met withal; and so it is, three or four times presently after one another, in 1 *Cor.* 4. 3, 4, 5. *But with me it is a very small thing, that I should be judged of you, or of Mans Judgment: Yea, I judg not mine own self:* That is, As for yours, or any Mans Judgment concerning my Faithfulness in my Stewardship, of the Mysteries of the Gospel (of which in the two former Verses) whether I am, or am not Faithful, I make a little account of it. Their Judgments upon many Accounts, it may be, being but little, if any probable signs of the Truth. Nay, I pass not Judgment concerning this thing Universally my self; I, it may be forgetting, or not seeing many things in my self: But the Lord is he that doth always, and hath right to Judg, who is All-knowing and Just, as it is in *Verse* 5.

3. More

3. More particularly yet: It ſignifies to paſs Judgment concerning a Perſons Innocency or Merit, that he is Innocent: That is, an Acquitting and Abſolving him, ſo is the Senſe: *To Judg the Cauſe of the Poor and Needy.* Spoken of *Jehoiakim*'s Father. And, *To Judg the Fatherleſs and Oppreſſed, that the Man of the Earth may no more Oppreſs,* Pſalm. 10. 18. Here, and in ſuch like the Septuagints word is κρίνειν, anſwering to the *Hebrew,* שפט and דין.

4. On the contrary, it oft-times ſignifies to paſs Sentence or Judgment concerning a Perſons Fault, or Guilt, or Puniſhment he deſerves, that he is Guilty, and deſerves Puniſhment; that is, to Condemn or Accuſe. For in both this is done, in the one as a Judg, in the other as a Witneſs: And therefore it ſignifies the ſame with its Compound, κατακρίνειν, to *Condemn.* This is alſo a moſt frequent Senſe of this word, both in the New and Old Teſtament, as *Rom.* 14. 3, 4. *Let not him that eateth, deſpiſe him that eateth not: And let not him that eateth not, judg him that eateth.*

That

That is, As he that did Eat, and was ſo well informed in his Liberty, of the good Effects of it, as to put no Diſtinction between Meats, upon the Account of any Divine Command, but only his own Prudence, was not to deſpiſe the other for his Ignorance: So he alſo who did make ſuch Diſtinctions, was not to condemn the other of Unconſcientiouſneſs or Prophaneneſs; that is, Neglect or Contempt of his Duty commanded by God's Revelation. And in *verſe* 4. is the ſame Senſe, *Who art thou that Judgeſt?* that is, Condemneſt another Mans Servant. Where, by the way, you muſt take Condemnation in the Senſe I ſhall by and by limit, as alſo underſtand it here between private Perſons, and with this Circumſtance, that it was before the Chriſtian *Jews* had time to inform themſelves well, and to underſtand the Reaſons of this Liberty; and to get rid of their Inclinations, to believe ſtill the *Moſaical* Law, to be obſerved even under the Meſſias's Government: But that by the Bye.

And to go no further, *ver.* 10. ſtill

of

of the ſame Chapter, *Why doſt thou judg, or why doſt thou ſet at nought thy Brother?* That is, ſurely, Why doſt thou ſo judg thy Brother, as after Judgment to contemn him, and to deſpiſe him? But ſuch a Judgment muſt be, that he is Faulty, or Ignorant, and that is to condemn him. Now which of theſe Senſes the word κρίνειν here hath, I ſhall by and by tell you, when I more explicately and diſtinctly inform you, what Judgment it is that is here forbidden.

Sect. II.

To give you yet a more diſtinct Notion of the General Senſe of this word κρίνειν, it is to be obſerved, that it conſiſts of two Parts. The Firſt is the Inward Action. The Second, the Signification of it.

The Firſt, Is to paſs Judgment only in a Mans thoughts, ſilently in ones own Breaſt.

The Second, Is to ſignifie this our Inward Judgment to others, by Words and

and Speech, or any other convenient Sign. I obſerve this principally, becauſe it may be permitted and laudable oft-times to do the Firſt, when it is not to do the Laſt. A Man may, nay ought often to give Judgment concerning things and Perſons; when he may, and ought not for many Reaſons to ſignifie it. Such as are the Circumſtances of the Perſons Faults, who may be a Superiour, a Governour, a Friend, one otherwiſe very Wiſe and Innocent, or one either through Baſhfulneſs, or Wrathfulneſs, not able to bear it, or many the like: So the Circumſtances of Company, either that there are any, or too many, or ſuch as will make more ill uſe of ſuch a Judgment of ours, may make it reaſonable and juſt, to abſtain from making known our Judgment. And many ſtill, other Circumſtances may there be, for theſe are but to give Inſtance.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

WE proceed to the Second General, *viz.* What kind of Judgment may be here Forbidden, or Commanded againſt, what this may be more Diſtinctly. And they may be among others, theſe Six things, ſome principally and firſtly, ſome occaſionally and ſecondarily.

1. Too great a Proneneſs, Propenſity, Inclination, Readineſs to paſs any inward Judgment in General, concerning other Mens Qualities and Actions.

2. Too great an Inclination to paſs this Judgment on the worſt ſide, to judg them Imperfect or Bad, to attribute ſome Defect or Infirmity to them, or to accuſe or condemn them for ſome Fault.

3. To paſs this Judgment without any Reaſon at all oft-times but only a Mans will: Sometimes indeed with ſome

ſome Reaſon, but little, ſlight, ſudden or in general, not with ſo much either on one ſide or t'other, as a Man might and ought to have found out and conſidered: When one doth not ſpend ſo much Time, nor uſe ſo much Care, Heed, and Attention, in the Reaſon of his Judgment as he ought, which ſometimes is more, ſometimes leſs, according to the Importance of the thing judged, or rather of the Judgment. And this is called Raſhneſs, or Temerity, a raſh Judgment, a raſh Cenſure of others.

4. To paſs this Judgment contrary to the Reaſons even appearing to us, (which muſt always proceed out of ſome bad Principle next to be named) ſometimes with ſome appearing Reaſons, but falſly. And this is called Falſe Judgment, which we ought to do what we can, when it is permitted us to judg, to prevent.

5. Too great a readineſs to declare, ſignifie, talk of theſe our Judgments; and that is, principally to do it upon all Occaſions not ſufficiently Reaſonable, nay, upon none at all.

6. And

6. And laſtly, Above all (in which only the Blame, Fault, Viciouſneſs, Iniquity, is to be found) a bad Principle or End of our Judgment concerning others, which is but too often the cauſe of all the other Imperfections. Such as is a want of Charity, Hatred or Malice, Self-love in General, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, and the like, of which hereafter. In all the former we may be Defective, Wanting, Imperfect; but here we are Wicked, Bad, Unrighteous.

Sect. I.

1. Too great a Proneneſs and Readineſs to paſs Judgment, concerning others in any Reſpect; which is always concerning their Qualities of Power, or Knowledg and Wiſdom, or their Goodneſs, or their Actions hence proceeding. I ſay, too great an one; for all paſſing of Judgment is not here prohibited, as I ſhall hereafter mention. Now this too great a Proneneſs or Inclination, is Various according to Perſons,

and

and muſt be determined by every Mans Prudence, when it is ſo. In ſome Men it may be much their Calling, their Buſineſs, it may be what is committed to their Care, for very excellent Uſes and Purpoſes to obſerve and give Judgment of others. And therefore they are to bend and incline themſelves to get ſo much Readineſs and Aptneſs, or Quickneſs, to obſerve and judg, as may make them beſt able to diſcharge that Truſt. Such are all kind of Governours, who have the Care of others Qualities and Manners; Magiſtrates, Miniſters, thoſe who have the Education of Youth, Maſters of Families. All theſe will do ill if they do not take notice, and judg concerning the Tempers, and Behaviours of their Subjects, People, Youth, Children and Servants, as much as they can, without too much Neglect of themſelves, or other worſe Effects. Again, There are ſome that obſerve others to very good Uſe and Purpoſe: what is Good, they are prone to imitate; what is Bad, to ſhun and avoid: and this that they

they may clearly apprehend Virtue and Vice; which oft-times we better ſee in others, than in our ſelves. What is uſually ſignified by the Proverb, *That Standers-by ſee more than Gameſters.* Men oft-times would neither be ſo Senſible of their own Virtue nor Vice, Good or Ill-Qualities, if they did not obſerve them in others. When they ſee a Man practiſing any Virtue, or uſing any good Quality of Prudence, Diligence, any Inſtance of Power rightly and well, and eſpecially when commended or thought well of, or having ſome other Advantage; it makes them well pleaſed with themſelves in theſe things, if they have them, or to endeavour to obtain them, if they want them. And ſo Vices often appear to us more and more ugly and naſty in others, than in our ſelves: Such as is Intemperance, Pride, Oppreſſion, *&c.* And what may the Obſerver ſay, Am I like ſuch a Perſon? I did not think I had been ſo Fooliſh, ſo Contemptible, Baſe, or Vile a thing before. Theſe Men too are ſo far from neglecting

themſelves thereby (the common Miſchief of our concerning our ſelves ſo much with others) that they mind themſelves hereby the more, and to better purpoſe.

But now on the other hand, but few Men are Governours of others at leaſt of many: many alſo obſerve and take notice of others good Qualities, and are thereby excited to affectation of being Superiour, conſequently to envy Detraction and Contempt. And you ſhall ſee them judg and ſpeak often of the moſt conſiderable Men, and the moſt conſiderable Qualities in them, with Abatement and Diminution; which as it may not ſometimes, ſo it moſt-what proceeds from the above-named Principles. They'll take notice too, more ſurely of their Imperfections, and be apt to be moved to be well-pleaſed therewith, from the former Principles ſtill; and conſequently to multiply and magnifie them. Now it were a great deal better for Men of ſuch a temper, to withdraw their Eyes from abroad, and to turn them home-ward, unleſs they could

could or would make better uſe of their Obſervation; and readineſs in ſuch Men to Obſerve and Judg others is too much, and therefore here forbidden. Others again there be, who may and do take notice and obſerve what others do, and are, generally with Approbation, and be ready to imitate every thing, and it may be the worſt things moſt. Thoſe who you ſhall ordinarily here ſay, that ſuch Perſons do ſo or ſo, that they may excuſe themſelves; theſe it were better for them to neglect and take no notice of other Men, and not to mind what others do. It is much better for thoſe Men to mind what they themſelves ſhould do, than what others do. Here again a little proneneſs to mind or judg what others are or do, is too much.

Sect. II.

2. The Second thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is too great a Proneneſs to paſs Judgment on the worſt ſide, to attribute ſome Imperfections to others, to accuſe and condemn them.

And this may be, though our Judgment be not falſe, (which is another Particular forbidden) but never ſo true; nor do we yet conſider or attend to the Principle from whence it proceeds, but only to the effect which is conſequent; and here again as in the former Particular, the Degree forbidden is various. Some Perſons may and ought to take notice of, Judg and Condemn other Mens imperfections and faults (but always be ſure, with as accurate truth as they can, with Prudence and Charity) more often and frequently, others rarely or little. Thoſe as I ſaid in the former Particular, who are Governours of others ſo far forth as they do and ought to undertake that Office, ſo much ought they to take notice, obſerve, judg, condemn, yea, reprove and correct (but always with Prudence and Charity, of which more hereafter) their Infirmities or Miſdemeanours. Thoſe alſo who do it out of no worſe end, nor find no worſe effect, than the good one of freeing themſelves from too general and confuſed admiration of other Mens Perſons,

and

and conſequently Approbation, imitation of all they do, though many things weakly and amiſs; finding themſelves firſt without Self-flattery, able to Judg from other Reaſons than Examples.

Thoſe alſo who having a deſire to be more exquiſitely and accurately perfect and good, mark the Imperfections or Miſcarriages of Men, and that of the beſt and moſt conſiderable, that they may prevent and amend them in themſelves, and be more accurate Patterns and Examples of Accompliſhment and Virtue. Not out of Pride or Affectation to be Superiour to all others; but out of a great deſire of perfecting themſelves, and out of Charity to others.

Such Perſons of ſuch a Temper, though very rarely I doubt, we may ſometimes meet withal. So likewiſe when Perſons, Eſtates, or Qualities are of great concernment, and influence to us and others, to the Publick, and this preſently and on a ſudden; and our Judgment might tend to prevent any miſchief there-from, which deferred would be too late in ſuch Caſes,

Sufficiency and Tendency to judg or believe rather on the worſt ſide, is to be preferred. The contrary would be too pernicious or hurtful Security. Such as theſe, I ſay, and Men in ſuch caſes, are to be allowed more frequently, to employ themſelves in obſerving and judging other Mens Imperfections or Faults, in their Temper or Conduct. But theſe on the other hand, who may experience not elſe-where better effects of this their Obſervation and Judgment, than an occaſion and temptation for, and a gratification of their Pride, Self-love, Envy, Affectation of Superiority, Malice, Ill-will, Revenge, or the like; ſo far forth as they experience this ſo much to them is it Prohibited.

And in general, it may be delivered as one pretty general ſign, when we may do this too much (there ſeldom being a better effect than this, a bad one) *viz.* When thereby we are indiſpoſed and hindred to take notice of, and approve of the good qualities and laudable that are in the ſame Perſons, and conſequently

quently judg of them in general very unjuſtly, and are according unreaſonably affected towards them, undervaluing, contemning, hating them; that is, the qualities in them when we ought not, or more than we ought: And this we may ſee, I doubt, too frequent and common an effect, of this Judging and Condemning Perſons; in ſo much that there are very few but may be hence concluded to be too much inclined and prone thereto, and to do it but too much. Where you hear one or once commended, and his good qualities obſerved, you may hear many, and many times diſpraiſed, and his Faults and Imperfections quoted; at leaſt oftner than they are really in proportion to their good Qualities and Actions, or oftner than they ſhould be ſignified and made known.

Sect. III.

3. The third thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is ones Judging without any Reaſon at all, but only ones

Will and Inclination, or without ſufficient Reaſon, the beſt he could or ought to have had all Circumſtances conſidered; that is, raſhneſs or temerity in Judging, and when it is on the worſt ſide, to condemn any Perſon, it is now uſually called raſh Cenſure. Of the firſt of theſe there is no Degrees or Differences, but it is perpetually in all Perſons at all times forbidden. For if there appear no Reaſon at all to us, why we ſhould judg one or t'other way, we are to ſuſpend our Judgment. That which is uſually expreſt by ſaying, we do not know, we cannot tell, it may, or it may not be ſo indeed; (if we apprehend the poſſibility) but whether it be or be not, we are Ignorant. In our Judgments concerning ſome things, we may ſometimes follow our Inclinations both without and contrary to ſome ſmaller Reaſons; but then they muſt be very ſtrong, ſuch as are natural and born with us, and which we cannot oppreſs or hinder by our wills though we would, and we do not find they proceed from any Inſincerity, any ſecret deſire or inclination

nation to gratifie any Luſt, but that we are poſſeſt with a ſerious and upright unmixed deſire to know the truth in order to Goodneſs: And this, indeed, ſeems to be a ſign of great reaſon for that Judgment, *viz.* Of this inclination being Impreſſed by God, and conſequently he being Good, that it is true and uſeful. Such are Mens ſtrong inclinations notwithſtanding all appearance of reaſon (though but ſuch, and and real deceits) to the contrary, which may be brought by Cavilling men, to believe God's Exiſtence, his Juſtice to puniſh and reward, Immortality of Souls, diſtinction of Actions right and wrong, univerſal Goodneſs our great perfection, and ultimate Self-love, contrary to the truth of our Senſes, *&c.* theſe God hath anticipated us withal. But in our Judgments concerning Perſons, no ſuch inclination is to be followed by no means, which notwithſtanding is extraordinary frequent, but always from ſome ſecret paſſion of hatred, diſpleaſure againſt the Perſon, not for any reaſon, but ſome bodily temper which is called

called Antipathy, and oft-times paſt offences, &c. Of the other, *viz.* Judging without ſufficient reaſon, there is variety; that which may be ſufficient reaſon to one Man, or at one time in one thing, may not be to another. One Man may be more capable and able to examine a thing further than another; and yet both, may be, ought to paſs their Judgment: As if one Friend ſhould for very good ends, ask the judgment of ſome other, concerning the Qualities or Actions of a third. So ſometimes the time for Deliberation or Information, may be neceſſarily ſhorter in one affair than in another; and yet the Judgment is then to be paſſed too, and not neglected: And ſo the Judgment concerning one thing of leſs moment (and yet enough to deſerve and require our Opinion too) may be with leſs reaſon or probability, than another of greater Importance. And here this raſh Judgment is not to be allowed on either ſide, as well to the advantage as diſadvantage of the Perſon, concerning his good or his ill-qualities or actions.

We

We are not to judg Men better than they are, as well as not worſe; and conſequently falſly and fooliſhly admire and approve of what they ſay or do without reaſon, only becauſe we will, and as we ſay we imagine ſo; not with that ſufficient Reaſon as we ought to have: Though the extream of Judging Men raſhly better than they are, being leſs frequent or hurtful, I ſuppoſe the other is here principally intended, *viz.* The Judging Men raſhly worſe than they are, and cenſuring them.

This Imperfection very often proceeds from *Ultimate*, and therefore *Inordinate* Self-pleaſing our ſelves by meer Activity of this kind. We muſt be paſſing Judgment of every thing we ſee, or that appears to us, and as ſoon and as faſt as may be; we cannot ſtay ſo long as to call to mind, or examine Reaſons. This is too troubleſome to moſt, and would ſpoil the pleaſure of it: Oft-times Men make it their Diverſion but imprudently choſen, to be at any rate wantonly Judging and Diſcourſing of Perſons in general. Often-

times

times alſo the Cauſe or Principle is Self-pleaſing again, by the exerciſe and ſenſe of our ability and ſufficiency of Wit or Underſtanding; we much pleaſing our ſelves that we can obſerve what others do and judg, and diſcern whether they are good or bad, do well or ill, eſpecially what the moſt conſiderable Men do; and here moſt, becauſe it is a ſign of a greater Comparative ability, that we ſee Imperfections and Defects, even in the Wiſer and Better ſort of Men, which they do not (as we think) ſee in themſelves. The firſt of theſe Cauſes is more ordinary, the ſecond in thoſe moſt often, who really are of conſiderable ability. Theſe are more innocent Cauſes as not arguing ſo much of Self-Love, in oppoſition to the good of others or to Charity; as the other of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, and thence ſecret Envy which are but too frequent.

Sect.

Sect. IV.

4. The Fourth thing forbidden is falſe Judgment, which although it may be more hurtful in effect, yet it may be and often is more innocent in the principle or end, than the former. For a Man may often judg falſe and out of Charity and Duty too, and with as ſufficient reaſon as he could find or obſerve. But yet a Man having firſt ſeen he may or ought to paſs his Judgment, ought to adhibit the greateſt care that it be true: This is a great inſtance of Juſtice which as every Man at all times is bound to, ſo then eſpecially when he undertakes to be a Judg.

The moſt general Inſtances of raſh and falſe Judgment concerning Perſons, Qualities and Actions, and perhaps which comprehend all others, are theſe:

1. When we Judg imperfections, defects, faults, of any kind or ſort to be in Men, when they are not.

2. When we Judg thoſe to be much greater imperfections, than indeed they

are

are compared with others, we miſtake in the quality. The firſt again is, Firſt, Either when we judg Imperfections to be in Men one or more, when either there is none, or not ſo many. When we miſtake in reſpect of the Number. Secondly, When we Judg more of that which is; a greater Degree and a greater Conſtancy of theſe Imperfections, which really are in the Perſons, to be in the Perſons, than there is, we miſtake in the Degree and in the Continuation or Duration: And thus on the contrary alſo, we often judg as raſhly and falſly of our ſelves, or any we favour, or who are Friends to us.

We judg perfections and good qualities to be in our ſelves and them, and more of theſe Perfections in number, and them to be greater, and more of each of them in Degree and Frequency, or Conſtancy, than indeed there is; when all this is a miſtake, and oft a ſilly or wilful one, and on the contrary judg ours and our Friends Imperfections and and their degrees of Intention and Frequency fewer, and the Imperfections

leſs

leſs than indeed they are; and we to that purpoſe conceal, connive at, forget them willingly, even to our own Conſciences and our beſt Friends, and this out of *ultimate* and fooliſh miſtaken Self-love. A thing often to be obſerved in ſick and dying Perſons, very backward to take notice of their ſins and faults, and the degrees of them, and to reckon them up all, and to make a frank acknowledgment to their own Conſciences or their Friends. A ſign too of no very great degree of Repentance, or a Converſion from ſin. In the firſt, we multiply and magnifie the Imperfections, Infirmities, Defects, ill-Qualities of others: Here the good ones. Surely much the better extream as to its Effects (as it ſeems) even when it proceeds from *ultimate* Self-love, as well as the other extream (which is too often) and not out of Charity.

A more particular and very uſeful Inſtance of the Firſt General is, when we Judg the Actions of Men to proceed from worſe Principles, Ends, Deſigns and Qualities in them, than indeed

deed they do. A thing the more diligently and carefully to be avoided, becauſe of very miſchievous and evil conſequences, and yet extraordinary frequent and eaſie to be fallen into. Thus often we accuſe and condemn Men of Covetouſneſs, Pride, Unconſcientiouſneſs, or the like, from ſome actions which really were the effects much of a wiſe and diſcreet Virtue, and had very little mixture if any of theſe Vices.

A thing very often, eſpecially happening in refuſal or denying, the Cravings and Deſires of others.

Thus we accuſe Men often of great Wilfulneſs, when it is Weakneſs, of Wickedneſs or Evil-diſpoſition of Will, when it is Ignorance and Imprudence; of deliberate Miſchievouſneſs, when it is a ſudden Surprize. How often ſhall you hear Men fiercely accuſe one another of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, than the firſt of which nothing more deviliſh and worſe, can be thought or ſaid of a Man, (though I wiſh it were not ſo often true) when there is no ſuch mat-

matter, but an impartial and upright Juſtice; that is, Charity to the Publick, or at worſt ignorance, miſtake, Mens not attending, forgetfulneſs or the like. This is very often ſeen in the behaviour of Sects and Parties one towards another: Where the Inconſiſtency of Opinions with good Conſcience, is often fiercely affirmed too univerſally, before it is known what Advantages they have had for Information. Though I acknowledg too, there may be oft very ſufficient ſigns for a very probable Judgment: This raſh and falſe Judgment in theſe or the like Inſtances being ſo miſchievous, and yet frequent, is (as I ſaid, when it is on the falſe ſide) diligently to be avoided; and rather let the defect, the raſhneſs, and the miſtake, be on the other hand; which uſually argues much of Wiſdom and Charity, good Nature, and a great freedom from *ultimate* and inordinate Self-love, and eſpecially when it is towards Adverſaries: And therefore it is a lovely and amiable thing, it is called good Interpretation and Candour. When

one judgeth moſt favourably, and putteth the beſt ſenſe and meaning upon Actions and external appearances, when there is equal probability on both ſides, or there is none at all of either appearing; and when it is conſtrain'd to judg worſe, it is with pity: According to that invaluable 13*th Chap.* of the firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, to be written in the moſt deep and laſting Characters in our Souls, and to be read every morning, nay, as oft as may be, *verſe* 5. *Charity as it beareth all things, ſo it believeth and hopeth all things.*

Sect. V.

5. The Fifth thing forbidden, is, too great a Proneneſs and Aptneſs to pronounce, to declare and make known our Judgment and Opinion concerning others, eſpecially on the bad ſide: To be always talking thereof, though to no viſible good effect, nor out of any good Principle. And to be in pain as it were till they have delivered themſelves, and this uſually comes too from the *Inordi-*

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nate love of Activity, of doing ſomewhat, of Reſtleſneſs, which is called Buſibodineſs; and ſometimes from the other worſe Qualities ſo often mentioned, Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, *&c.* and moſtly from a mixture of more of them together: With all which too, as in all other Actions of Men inſincere, (as moſt are I doubt) ſome ſmall mixture ſometimes there may be of Juſtice, that is, of a kind of common Charity. This too great Proneneſs or Inclination conſidered without its Principle or End, (as I have told you before) admits of Variety. Some Men ought to have more, as all Governours and Overſeers of others Manners, or in general of their good Qualities. Thoſe alſo that find the good effects of good Inſtruction, Self-amendment, kindly and laudable Emulations, Pity, an endeavour for the good of the faulty, and of others, to amend or prevent the ſame elſe-where. Others on the contrary who are private Perſons, in a private Capacity or Condition, apt to gratifie thereby their Envy, Pride, Hatred, Contempt of o-

thers, Self-conceit, affectation of Superiority, will have seldomer sufficient reasons to pass or declare their Judgment; and when they have, the good effects are not so considerable in them as in the former Persons: Consequently they must nourish a lesser Proneness and Inclination thereto. These Men also who find they can better discern, choose, govern, and Instruct themselves in all Circumstances, of declaring their Opinion concerning Persons, such as I have before mentioned, of the Persons judged, the Persons before whom, *&c.* These also may be more free, and allow themselves more of this Proneness. Those on the contrary, who may and ought to observe themselves forgetful, unable to take notice, or discern the fittest Circumstances; or not to be able to moderate or govern themselves when they do, but what they have in their mind it must come out; those who are thus dull and weak, ought to lay aside this Proneness and Inclination, to subjugate or weaken it so far forth, and to betake themselves more to mind their own affairs immediately. In

In General (of which more hereafter) the declaration of this our Judgment, muſt always be done with all the ſigns, and with the beſt effects we can of Charity, in doing Good, and conſequently Self-denial. Charity, I ſay, ſometimes more immediately reſpecting the Perſon of whom we judg, ſometimes our ſelves, it may be, (as in the caſe of ſin, when we ought to vindicate our ſelves) ſometimes ſome others, Byſtanders, ſometimes altogether: Be ſure let there not appear any the leaſt ſign of doing it out of *ultimate* reſpect to our ſelves in any kind, nor let the effect be only ſuch with a neglect of, or in oppoſition to the good of the Perſon, or others. And a great many ſigns there are of this, which may better come in in another place.

Sect. VI.

6. And laſtly. And above all is here forbidden, the undue end of our Judging others, *viz.* Self-pleaſing *ultimately*, and that ſeveral ways, by others

hurt or miſchief, poſitive or privative: Theſe are, Malice, Hatred, Pride, Envy, Revenge, Flattery and baſe Fear, Buſibodineſs, Curioſity, &c. This is that which is here principally intended; this mainly advis'd againſt by our Saviour; as alſo judging on the worſt ſide, ſuſpecting, accuſing, condemning Perſons out of the foreſaid Principles. As appears by the reaſon ſubjoyned both in this and the next Verſe, [*Judg not*] is here taken in the ſenſe in which [*that you be not judged*] is: But by that is meant ſuſpected, accuſed, condemned by others, principally out of the former Principles. For if it were meant of the Judgment of the good ſide, the avoiding of that would be no motive not to judg, becauſe it would not ſeem an evil to the Perſon judging. I ſay, principally: Moreover, I have mentioned the defect of being too prone in general to paſs Judgment, though it may happen on the good ſide; and ſo to declare ones Judgment, and to judg raſhly or falſly, though ſtill on the good ſide on this occaſion, as belonging to our

our Judgments, to ſuggeſt unto you, that they might be occaſionally forbidden too, and are Defects, Infirmities. All the forementioned Particulars, if they can be ſuppoſed to proceed not from theſe bad Principles, but from good, *viz.* Charity, though imprudent and miſtaken; though they may be immediately hurtful and do miſchief, yet they are not vicious, faulty, wicked. But more of this when we come to the Cauſes of theſe forbidden Judgings here, eſpecially of raſh and falſe ones.

CHAP. III.

Sect. I.

BUt what Judgments are here not forbidden, though they may be apt to be miſtaken for thoſe which are. And in general theſe two, *viz.*

1. Not an obſerving or judging out

of *Charity*, a ſincere and unmixed *Charity*. For ſometimes, ſurely, we may exerciſe our Charity both in good and bad Judgments. The principal thing here forbidden, is paſſing our Judgment out of bad Principles, ſuch as are *Ultimate* Selfiſhneſs, Malice, Hatred, Pride, Envy, *&c.* But then the contrary cannot be forbidden to paſs Judgment out of a good one, and the only good one, *viz.* Charity, or Goodwill, unleſs all Principles of a Mans actions were forbidden.

Sect. II.

Nor, Secondly, Is it ever forbidden to a Perſon, when there are more good effects of his doing this, than of his omiſſion: Nay, then contrary-wiſe he is commanded to do it. The firſt reſpects our Principles or End: The ſecond our Prudence or the Effect. The firſt of theſe may be without the ſecond, *viz.* A Man may give his Judgment and Opinion concerning Perſons and Actions, out of Charity and very good In-

Intentions of doing the moſt good unlimitedly in general, whether it be particularly applied to our ſelves or others, or both; and yet, as far as we ſee, the effects of it may be bad. A Man may both inwardly and outwardly commend and diſcommend Perſons unſeaſonably with a very good meaning, through want of Information. And ſo the ſecond may be without the firſt too; that is, There may be very good effects and conſequences of a Mans paſſing and pronouncing his Judgment, when the principle may be bad enough. A Man may approve or condemn what is truly good or bad in others, and conſequently diſpoſe himſelf and others to an imitation of the one, and an eſchewing of the other, eſpecially if he be a Perſon of ſome eſteem; and yet he may do the firſt out of fear or flattery, or becauſe it is like ſome-what in himſelf, not becauſe it is a quality or thing really profitable to the World, and therefore would have it more propagated. And the ſecond out of Envy, Hatred, &c. not becauſe it is a thing miſchievous

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and hurtful to the Perſon himſelf, to others, or diſpleaſing to God Almighty.

In ſumm, whenſoever it doth appear to any Man that it would be worſe if he did not paſs his Judgment, that there would be worſe conſequences thereof than if he did, any where to others as well as himſelf, conſidering himſelf but as any other Perſon, juſt in the ſame Circumſtances; and to do it for this very reaſon and cauſe, this common Good; this, I ſay, is not here prohibited.

Sect. III.

Thirdly, But more particularly therefore in the firſt place, it is not univerſally prohibited here to paſs Judgment. In the Caſes and Circumſtances I have formerly mentioned, and innumerable more (if we deſcend to particulars) it is not. It is much permitted, nay, enjoyned to Governours, ſomewhat leſs to private Perſons. Laudable it is in Men to have regard to, and obſerve the qualities and actions generally of thoſe that

that are their Superiors, to compare their own with, and ſee their defect, and to be excited to Amendment and Imitation: To look at, and to judg their own faults in others, if thereby they find themſelves diſpoſed to ſee them more clearly in themſelves, and to be put in mind of them. Laudable it is to obſerve good qualities in others that we may rejoyce in them, and be glad to ſee any thing good in the World, and be able to encourage it by a diſcreet Obſervation and Commendation thereof. Conſequently we are not commanded to be negligent, and utterly careleſs of what other Men care or do: For this is contrary to the former generals of Charity and Prudence, we ſhould then be prohibited both thoſe. Out of Prudence and Charity to our Neighbour, both good and bad Men, and to our ſelves too, we are obliged to take notice of them what they are and do; to encourage and help, or to rejoyce in what is good, to check, hinder, and prevent what is bad and miſchievous in the World, by our pity and juſt endeavours. We are not ſure-

ly

ly to ſay with *Cain*, *Am I my Brothers keeper?* Yes, we are all ſo, that is, we ſhould be ſo: We are not like Brutes, to live only within our own Skins, to care for no Body but our ſelves, and inhumanly to ſay, What care we what others do? We'll look after our ſelves; let them be good or bad we matter not, we think it beſt always to mind our ſelves; we ſee Men buſie themſelves too much about others matters. In the firſt of which thou art bad and wicked, being only ſelfiſh; in the other miſtaken and imprudent. Thou art always to have regard to the common good in all thou art and doſt, and therefore when thou applieſt thy ſelf to mind thy ſelf, and to do good to thy ſelf, it muſt always be to fit thy ſelf to do moſt good in general, it muſt have that for the end. Thou art alſo often (and thy own prudence muſt determine, for it may be too often) to ſtep out and ſee what others do and are, and concern thy ſelf charitably and prudently for thy Neighbours, and to pleaſe and ſerve God conſequently; there is a time when this

this is beſt. Beſides, indeed thou mindeſt thy own ſelf to beſt purpoſe and effect, when thou diſpoſeſt thy ſelf to be of this charitable and prudent Temper; which may ſometimes be beſt done by uſe and exerciſe.

Sect. IV.

Fourthly, Nor in the next place is it prohibited univerſally to paſs Judgment on the worſt ſide, to Accuſe or Condemn; for it is permitted to the Overſeers of others Manners, and Inſtructors, and Teachers of good Manners; and to Friends, whoſe care and induſtry for the good of thoſe whom they thus judg it will excite; to thoſe that would free themſelves from too partial an admiration of Perſons; to thoſe who have a mind and deſign to be more accurately good, in things of more great and publick Concernment; and in many other Circumſtances, which every ones private prudence muſt determine. Much leſs ſtill is the contrary commanded or indulged, *viz.* To judg that good and

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this is beſt. Beſides, indeed thou mindeſt thy own ſelf to beſt purpoſe and effect, when thou diſpoſeſt thy ſelf to be of this charitable and prudent Temper; which may ſometimes be beſt done by uſe and exerciſe.

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and laudable which is bad and to be condemned, to judg falſly on the beſt and favourable ſide: for to judg falſly is ever forbidden, and to judg according to Truth when we do judg, is always commanded and enjoyned. We are not neither to think well of all Perſons, and all in Perſons, to praiſe, ſpeak well of all things. We may and ought, when Charity and Prudence are the reaſons of our uſing our Judgments, to think of things as they are, to think that bad or faulty which is ſo, as near as we can be informed, and to ſay ſo too; as it follows in the next particular.

Sect. V.

Fifthly, Nor in the next place is it here univerſally forbidden to declare and make known our Judgments, and that on the worſt ſide. But there are many Circumſtances in which it is of much better effect ſo to do. Sometimes to reprove (always with Charity and Diſcretion to be ſure) the Guilty or Faulty, and to let him know our Opi-

Opinion concerning any Actions, or Temper, or Quality in him, may be of excellent uſe, and be a means to amend the Perſons, and to prevent the like for the future. Sometimes to admoniſh others, leſt they imitate or do the like; we may make known our Judgment to them, eſpecially when the faulty Perſon is Incorrigible, or to prevent ſome fraud, or hurt or miſchief that otherwiſe might be done by one to another: We are not always to hold our Tongue, nor conceal all ſigns of our Opinions, be Meal-mouth'd for fear of diſpleaſure, or the like cauſes; which as it may be in the effect very miſchievous, ſo it proceeds uſually from Treachery or Cowardize. Much leſs ſtill is it commanded or permitted here to ſignifie a contrary Judgment, to what we really have in our Breaſts; to ſpeak or otherwiſe ſo to behave our ſelves as if we thought well of, approved and liked that which we do not: To do this out of the ſelf-end of preventing any evil, or procuring any good from a Perſon, is called Flattery. We are not to ſay, *That*

evil

evil is good, or darkneſs light. We are not either for fear or favour, to Commend and Praiſe what in our Judgment and Conſcience we condemn. But when we think our ſelves obliged to declare, and make known our Opinion and Judgment concerning any Perſon or Actions, it muſt always be with Truth, although it be to diſapprove or condemn. But then to be ſure, let this be always done with a ſincere inward Charity, and all the juſt ſigns of it, and of freedom from any Self-deſign, and eſpecially that which is in ſuch a caſe moſt ordinary and ſuſpected, *viz.* from Pride and Imperiouſneſs, and therefore with Modeſty, with great Diſcretion and Prudence; that is, a diſcerning and fore-ſeeing when it may, and when it may not be of good uſe and effect to do or not do it: Of which hereafter under another Head.

Here is to be noted, that as theſe Actions of Judgment are not prohibited, ſo not all Inclinations thereto.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

We proceed to the Fourth General Head. viz.

Sect. I.

TO Inſtance in ſome of the Cauſes of theſe prohibited Judgments here, thoſe eſpecially which are more Proper, Immediate, Frequent, and moſt in our own power to prevent.

We muſt run them over again. And

Firſt, Of too much Proneneſs to judg in general the Cauſes ſome of them may be:

1. Too much Idleneſs: By which I mean not a Man's doing nothing (for that cannot be, every Body is always employ'd, his Thoughts are always taken up about ſomewhat) but a Mans not having any deſtined or ſet-purpoſed-Employment, which one ſhould always chuſe, as that in which he can beſt

ſerve God and the World, do moſt good in his Generation. A neither deſigning nor purpoſing to purſue always, (or at leaſt but when any extraordinary occaſion happens) any particular, nor his General calling, as is uſually diſtinguiſhed; neither that which he with ſome others employ themſelves about, nor that which all Men ſhould, ſuch as Reflection upon ones own Actions, the end, deſign, the event or effect of them; the having reſpect to the pleaſing of God, and doing good ſome way or other to our Neighbour, to the Publick, and the performance of ſome general Duties to God and our Neighbour, which all are conſtantly obliged to perform. Men's not having, I ſay, conſtantly ſuch deſigned, purpoſed, and ſet-employment, gives their Mind leave, lets them at liberty to wander about any where, to be employed about any thing that ſhall from any cauſe be thruſt upon them, or ſhall occur. Now this is far more uſually others Perſons and Actions than themſelves; partly becauſe they are far more the object of our External Senſes,

Senſes, which affect Men generally more ſtrongly and frequently than any thing from within themſelves; and then what we have propoſed or objected to us, we naturally and laudably are prone to be judging ſomewhat or other concerning them, or appertaining to them. But Men that have any ſet conſtant Calling to employ themſelves in, and beſides perform their general Duties to God, their Neighbour and themſelves, are not ſo much at leaſure to mind and attend to what others are and do, and conſequently to judg. Juſt for Example, as Idle wandring Beggars, who, as we ſay, are never out of their way, and have no certainly deſigned Place or Buſineſs, turn to every By-Houſe to ſee who dwells there. They look upon, obſerve, talk to or talk of every Paſſenger they meet; when the Man that hath ſome deſigned Affair or Buſineſs, with certain time and place in his Journey, hardly obſerves or minds, or but very little and paſſingly, the Company upon the Rode, nor any way diverts or ſtops himſelf: Such was

the fault of the younger Widdows which Saint *Paul* bids *Timothy* to adviſe: *They learnt to be Idle, wandring about from Houſe to Houſe*; and then, *They were Tatlers and Buſiebodies, ſpeaking things which they ought not*, 1 Tim. 5. 13. This is a privative Cauſe.

Sect. II.

Secondly, The Love of Activity *meerly, ultimately,* to no better end but only to pleaſe themſelves therein. Themſelves are too little a Sphere, there is more variety of things to be obſerved and judged in all others who they know, than only in themſelves; whence they do it with greater life and vigour, Men think it a dull thing (and that's their only reaſon) to mind principally themſelves, and things appertaining to them, and it may be the ſame things too for the moſt part, to live in a round; not always, but ſo much as is for moſt Men moſt expedient. And then when Men do obſerve or take notice of others Perſons, qualities, and actions, they will be

be paſſing Judgment, becauſe there is more of Action, than in ſuſpending, doubting, or meerly obſerving. That ſeems to be a ſlow dull thing too in compare with a Mans briskly and ſmartly, and uninterruptedly paſſing Judgment. Beſides that, ſuſpending, doubting, being Ignorant, argue an imperfection, and this fault may have the name of Buſibodineſs, *viz.* When out of love of being Buſie, meerly to be always doing ſomewhat, and that with vigour and ſmartneſs, Men employ their Thoughts in Obſerving and Judging other Mens, either Qualities or Actions: Not out of any Neighbourly or Charitable Principle; not becauſe they ſee a great deal of good they may do by it, and therefore would do it accordingly; that is, not out of Reaſon, Prudence, Charity. Men oft-times Buſſle and are Buſie in the World, and they know no other Reaſon but that they love to be ſo; and nothing more often occurs about which they may be ſo, than what other Men are or do.

Sect. III.

Thirdly, The third cauſe is ſometimes Curioſity; that is, a Mans pleaſing himſelf *meerly and ultimately*, in knowing ſomething he did not know before, and being very much conceited of himſelf there, for not directing his knowledg to thoſe things which are moſt profitable, which he can make beſt uſe of, do moſt good withal, nor attending to them. Hence it comes to paſs that Men are not content to mind, and know themſelves or their own minds (if it was leſs difficult than it is;) nor yet things more nearly Relating to themſelves, which is more eaſie: But they are alſo more inquiſitive into, and deſirous to know the Affairs of others, what they are and do, and obſerve them, and conſequently to paſs Judgment of them; which is a ſign to them, but oft a very falſe one, that they do know: Becauſe we uſe to do ſo, and ſhould do ſo, *viz.* Paſs Judgment only of things we do know. If

we

we ſhould not paſs Judgment, but doubt or ſuſpend, we ſhould ſeem to our ſelves to be Ignorant; which we would not do becauſe we will *altimately*, and pleaſe our ſelves not to be ſo. To doubt, or to ſuſpend ones Judgment becauſe one does not know, is but very rare and in few Tempers; but it ſhould be always and is to be preferred before Knowledg, becauſe it is a better thing, a greater excellency to *withhold a Mans Judgment*, where there is no Reaſon ſeen, where one doth not know or ſee (the Connexion of what he affirms and does) the Truth it ſelf, than it is to *know the Truth it ſelf*. The one is but a perfection of our Underſtanding, t'other a great virtue of our Wills, and we ſhall be the wiſer the more we thus judg, and accordingly behave our ſelves: I ſay, rather to ſay and think we do not know when we indeed do not, then to know though never ſo certainly.

Sect. IV.

Fourthly, A fourth cauſe may be an Inſtance or Branch of Pride; that is, to pleaſe our ſelves too much *meerly*, either that we have, or are reputed to have, an ability and ſufficiency to underſtand, and direct others and their affairs too, better than they themſelves can: When 'tis only ſo conceitedly by us, and we know not others Circumſtances; or were we in them we would do the like or worſe; or if we had this ability, perhaps we had better be without it; whilſt it makes us leſs able to underſtand and direct our ſelves, by uſing our minds to Wander abroad, and to attend to others, and depriving us of the opportunities of Self-reflection. It is very often ſeen, that thoſe who are extraordinary forward not out of ſome ſence of Duty to give Counſel, Advice, or Judgment of other Mens Concerns, are very negligent and careleſs, and unapt to follow the very ſame, when it is as uſeful and profitable for themſelves.

Sect.

Sect. V.

Secondly, For ſome of the Cauſes of too great a Proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, whether truly or falſly, (but not therefore, or becauſe they are true or falſe) in our ſelves, they are all either Ignorance, or ſome Ill-diſpoſition of Will.

1. Ignorance, *viz.* Of the bad effects or conſequences of this our too great Proneneſs, which Ignorance may proceed from Ill-diſpoſitions of Will, either on ſet purpoſe, or deſigned then when we judg; and we wilfully ſhut our Eyes, and do not attend to what might better inform us; or it may be contracted before. But it may proceed too ſometimes, even from Love and Charity. So we ſee ſometimes Perſons much deſirous of their Relations, or others Good and Well-fare, very apt always to ſuſpect the worſe of them, and to obſerve their Beginning, bad Inclinations, and to think them ſo; but not ſo much to take notice of the

the contrary good ones in them; and this partly that they might timely prevent any evil that may happen to them thereby. And ſo may it be in publick Affairs, and of very great and univerſal Concernment eſpecially, and yet ſoon out of our power; nay, ſo we ſee it in our ſelves ſometimes. Some Men being too apt to look upon their Faults and Imperfections, and to magnifie them, and to take no notice of what's good in themſelves, and conſequently to judg falſly concerning themſelves on the worſt ſide: Though this is but rare in compare with the other extream, and proceeds from an imprudent and ignorant love, not attending that they ought, and may do themſelves as much good by their being pleaſed with, and encouraged by, and thankful for the good they have; as by being afraid of, removing, and preventing any evil fallen upon them, or that may fall upon them: and not conſidering ſtill that it's beſt be ſure, all things conſidered, to judg always according to Reaſon and Truth; not to trouble and perplex our

ſelves

ſelves with vain fears and endeavours, and for other good effects thereof.

Sect. VI.

Sixthly, But I doubt the far more uſual Cauſes of too great Proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, are ill-diſpoſitions of Will in general, Self-love and Self-pleaſing *ultimately* in various Inſtances, ſuch as are more particularly Self-pleaſing by:

1. Hatred of, or Malice (an habitual Hatred) againſt any Perſon in general: Than which there is nothing in the World more deteſtable, becauſe the moſt Miſchievous, and it is the greateſt degeneracy from, the moſt oppoſite and contrary to, the moſt excellent perfection in the World, which is Goodneſs, and is uſually attributed to the Devil; that is, the worſt of Beings. This is when a Man pleaſeth himſelf *ultimately* in doing miſchief to, in vexing and hurting another Man, other Perſons. It is eaſie to ſee, how this diſpoſeth a Man to the greateſt readineſs

dineſs to judg any thing bad in the Perſon to whom he is thus affected. For if we thus pleaſe our ſelves in doing Miſchief, we ſhall endeavour that we may ſtill pleaſe our ſelves, ſo to do; and that we may ſo do, we'll repreſent Perſons as bad as we can, as great evils (whether true or falſe, it matters not) as we can. This, I ſay, manifeſtly is a Cauſe in us of being miſchievouſly affected, and of doing what we can to them: And this again, is a Cauſe to ſuch Perſons of Pleaſure and Delight. He therefore that wills the End, *viz.* Pleaſing himſelf by the miſchief of others, will will the Means thereto; and that's one, *viz.* Judging them as great Evils as we can. It is like a Man's dreſſing up another Perſon in ugly or contemptible Habit, that he might pleaſe himſelf in hating or contemning him; whereas the Perſon's true and natural Make or Features, was more beautiful and comely than his own. But this is ſo truly a hateful diſpoſition, that I would be willing rather to think there is no ſuch thing amongſt

amongſt Men, what-ever there may be amongſt the Infernal Spirits, or elſewhere in the World.

2. Though in the ſecond place, Revenge comes ſomewhat near it; that is, to pleaſe ones ſelf in doing evil to another Man, meerly becauſe he hath done evil to him; which is a very unreaſonable thing. For why ſhould there be more miſchief in the World, becauſe there hath been ſome already? Clear contrary, the more there hath been, the leſs there ſhould be. I know oft-times there is a mixture of Juſtice and Self-defence, to prevent the like for the future, but oft-times too there is more pretended than there is; and when there is a love to Juſtice and a juſt and reaſonable Defence, it is a Cloak to hide much of the other too, or a Pill that hath much of that Poyſon in it. We have the more need to be Skilful and Subtle in the diſcovery of the ſincerity of our Hearts; that is, the ends or deſigns that move our Wills.

Now it is here likewiſe manifeſt, that to judg a Perſon as bad and as imperfect

fect as we can, will augment, whetten and ſharpen our Revenge, and conſequently if we be ſo wickedly diſpoſed, our Pleaſure and Delight too; and as before, he that wills the End wills the Means thereto, when he ſees it is ſo: In revenge too, is often mixed the affectation of Superiority.

3. Somewhat leſs a bad Cauſe, but bad enough too, is Pride, or a Self-pleaſing *ultimately* in the inſtances of our power: And here more particularly,

(1.) Self-pleaſing in our Superiority to others in any thing, a branch of Pride, *i. e.* to be *Ultimately and more than ought* pleaſed therewith, *inordinately and immoderately.* A very miſchievous Temper and Appetite. I do not ſee that any degree thereof is allowable, or that it doth any good more than the gratification of the proud Perſon. To affect to be Superiour in ſome excellent and uſeful Quality, may be an occaſion ſometimes of a Man's excelling therein, and conſequently of ſome good effect: But it is not becauſe he affects Superiority, that is not the preciſe Cauſe,

Cauſe, but becauſe that Superiority happens to be an excellent thing. And yet more particularly.

(2.) Envy a kind of this affectation of Superiority, not the paſſion ſo much; that is, a deſire of depriving others of any Good they poſſeſs which we have not; (as is to be underſtood too, in the fore-going cauſe of Hatred and Revenge) but the cauſe or principle of our being prone to this Paſſion; that is, pleaſing our ſelves *ultimately*, that we have ſome good things which others have not, and being very glad they have them not, and ſorry and grieved if they have them: And this makes us to will both that it ſhould ſeem ſo to us, and that it really ſhould be ſo. That it ſhould ſeem ſo; and therefore we wilfully judg it is ſo, that others are in general much Inferiour to us in any good thing, or leſs Superiour at leaſt than indeed they are, and therefore particularly that they are guilty or defective, where we are not, that they are ſuch or ſuch. We would have others not better, or as bad, or worſe than our ſelves,

ſelves, and are much pleaſed it is ſo, and therefore we make it to ſeem ſo to our ſelves, and wilfully judg it ſo, when it may be it is not in our power really to make it ſo. For the ſame reaſon Envy alſo makes us to will it ſhould be ſo indeed, and to endeavour it as much as we can: and therefore particularly, ſo far as we eſteem, honour, love; reward good things, that they ſhould not be honoured, beloved, rewarded, or the like, and conſequently that they ſhould not ſeem to others to merit it; and conſequently both to judg and make known our Judgment very greedily and readily that they do not, to bear witneſs againſt them. It is called Detraction, when a Man from this or ſuch like Principle, is judged not to have ſome good Quality that he hath really; and Slander when he is judged to have ſome bad one, which he is free from. A contrary temper to that wiſe Admonition of the Wiſe-man, *Prov.* 24. 17. *Rejoyce not when thine Enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he ſtumbleth.*

(3.) Con-

(3.) Contempt, this hath an effect contrary to admiration: Admiration of any Perſon in general and confuſedly, cauſeth a Man to judg all things in or any way belonging to that Perſon excellent, and to attribute more to him than he hath. Contempt in general of a Perſon, on the contrary, cauſeth us to judg all things appertaining to the Perſon contemned, mean or ſmall, or to attribute to him many and greater Imperfections than indeed are in him, in ſome ſuch manner ordinarily ſignified. Tuſh, there is no great matter in ſuch a Perſon, indeed he may be ſo or ſo: But that's a ſmall thing if he be; nay, there is nothing laudable in him, what's matter what he ſaith or doth? He is weak, ſilly, wilful, &c. Whereas we ought not thus confuſedly to paſs Judgment, but more diſtinctly; if there be any thing contemptible, yet there may be other things very conſiderable. Men alſo may pleaſe themſelves meerly in contempt of another, as a Mark or Sign (to themſelves, though it may be to no Body elſe) of their own Superi-

ority, and being better; and that they may more contemn and conſequently pleaſe themſelves, (as it was before in hatred) make him appear to themſelves, and judg him much more contemptible than he is. Both theſe laſt particulars are contrary to the Apoſtolical Precept, in that excellent Chapter, *Rom.* 12. 10. *In honour preferring one another.* Be we rather inclin'd to judg others better than our ſelves, and to give unto them the ſigns thereof, rather, I ſay, than aſſume them to our ſelves, even when equal probability of both ſides, or ſome (it may be) advantage of our own: for the more excellent effect only ſometimes of checking and controuling, and ſubduing, and bringing under Command, that unreaſonable and inordinate Self-love. Theſe three are Branches of Pride.

(4.) A fourth cauſe is Flattery in Judging: That is, when a Man pleaſeth himſelf *ultimately*, in pleaſing any one that is an Adverſary or Enemy to the Perſon concerning whom he gives Judgment, and conſequently is well pleaſed

pleaſed to hear of his Faults or Imperfections. A Man may uſe out of Flattery ſo often to tell his Judgment to the diſadvantage of a Perſon, that at laſt he may unawars come to believe it himſelf; and partly that his Flattery may not at any time be diſcovered, oblige himſelf to believe it, and perſwade himſelf that that is true, which before he did but ſay was ſo, though he thought the contrary. And here it may be obſerved, that as too great a Proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, doth proceed from theſe Cauſes mentioned: So it is a moſt ordinary thing for the paſſing, and eſpecially declaring ones Judgment and Opinion on the advantagious ſide, *i. e.* That a Man hath more of ſome good thing than indeed he hath, to proceed from ſome of the ſame Cauſes too, *viz.* Hatred, Envy, Indignation. For Example, That a Man hath more Revenue, Treaſure, Honour, Power, Eaſe, Pleaſure, than indeed he hath, only to expoſe him more to the Envy or Indignation of others. And in general, Men judg thus in a thing which

they account a reward to him who they think doth not, or they would not have him either to merit or receive it, moſt commonly it is an eaſie thing from Circumſtances, to diſcern from what Principles ſuch Judgment proceeds: But ſome may be ſo cunning as to conceal or diſſemble.

Sect. VII.

Seventhly, For the Cauſes of raſh Judgment and Cenſure, they muſt be the ſame with thoſe of the two former particulars. The Cauſes of raſh Judgment in general, Idleneſs, Buſibodineſs, Activity, Curioſity, Pride, and of raſh Cenſure or Judgment, without Reaſon, but a Mans own Will on the worſt ſide as ſuch; are among others, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flattery. To which we may add Anger and Wrath, which if a Man be not very careful, diſpoſeth us to as much uncharitable and unreaſonable Judging as the former, and a Man is ſeldom

ſeldom or never to truſt his Judgment of any Perſon after that fierce and confounding Paſſion, but refer it to another time, when calmneſs and freedom from Paſſion, gives him more ability to ſee the Truth, and more impartiality to judg. And now all theſe Cauſes, methinks, are ſo Unreaſonable, Inhumane, and Unchriſtian, when thus nakedly repreſented, that they cannot but ſtir up in Souls not quite degenerate, or corrupted, dead, and ſenſleſs of what's good, many of theſe very Paſſions againſt themſelves, and ſeem the ugliеſt Objects that can be beheld. Theſe are thoſe which compoſe a Devil more, and are more eſſential to him than any other ſhape.

Sect. VIII.

IV. The Cauſes ſome of them of falſe Judging as falſe, or of falſity, errour of Judgment concerning Perſons, whether on the good or bad ſide, may, as in all other falſe Judgments, be reduced to two within us in General.

1. Defect in our Underſtanding which here in this caſe is but one, *viz.* Ignorance, in a large ſenſe, *viz.* the Abſence, or want of Apprehenſion, or of the actual Knowledg of ſomething which would influence our Judgments.

2. In our Will, a meer inclination to any certain falſe Judgment, whether it be from Cuſtom and Uſe, or from the Love, and for the ſake of any certain Object.

In this particular caſe of falſe Judgments, ſome of the moſt frequent Cauſes more or leſs remotely, and ſome way or other reducible to theſe two, are theſe:

Sect. IX.

(1.) In general; meer Ignorance of the truth of things, where there is no defect of Will. So a Man may judg an action in reſpect of the effect and principle of it, to be well or ill done, when it is the contrary; and it was the caſe of the Jewiſh and Gentile Chriſtians, paſſing Judgment of one ano-

anothers Eating, and abſtaining from certain Meats, and obſerving or not obſerving ſome certain Days and Times, and conſequently impoſing them upon one another from their own private Opinions; not as determined by their rightful Superiours or Governours, *Rom.* 14. Some of them through Ignorance judged, that thoſe who took the Liberty to eat forbidden Meats, contrary to the *Moſaical Law* (which they thought was ſtill even under the Meſſias to be obſerv'd) did an evil Action, and out of an evil Principle too poſſibly, *viz.* Prophaneneſs, or want of that reſpect for God's Commands which they ought: And this probably too, becauſe they found in themſelves that if they ſhould do ſo, it would proceed from ſuch a Principle (which will be a ſecond Cauſe preſently to be named.) The other *Gentile* Chriſtians judged right concerning the action of abſtaining from Meats, that it was not right; and the Non-obſervation of, or Liberty from the *Jewiſh* Law was a Chriſtian priviledg, or it did not be-

long to the Chriſtian Religion: But poſſibly too they might (if they did not) judg wrong, concerning the Principle of theſe Jewiſh Chriſtians, *viz.* That it was out of Superſtition or Pride, that the *Gentiles* might not be in all things equalized to themſelves, and that the Ancient Conſtitutions of their Religion might ſeem more conſiderable. From hence alſo (more particularly) it proceeds, that even very Honeſt and Juſt Perſons (though much oftner in the World, it proceeds from *ultimate* Self-love or a mixture of it) judg themſelves Comparatively more Superiour to others in good qualities, and truly more valuable than they are, *viz.* They know and obſerve more their own Perfections and good Qualities, their Number, their Nature, the degrees of their worth and excellency from their effects, than they do thoſe of others. They can tell better all the Good qualities they have in themſelves, than what are in others; many of which, or but few, they may ever have had occaſion to obſerve: They may

may alſo, and do ſee, and take notice of all the uſes and good effects of any Perfection which is in themſelves, having frequent occaſion to obſerve them; but hardly of any of that which is in another; when he poſſibly could quote as many more of his. And hence (a little further) it comes to paſs, that every one extols and crys up his own Art though never ſo trivial, and prefers it before others, really believing what he ſaith. Hence alſo it is, together with ſome Raſhneſs and Precipitancy in inferring, that Men judg others too generally and too confidently to be Ill or Good qualified Perſons; to have more of Defects or Perfection comparatively each with other, than they really have; that they have (for +~~Christ~~) ſuch or ſuch ill qualities and imperfections (which may be true) but none or much fewer good quallities to balance them, than indeed they have; and than they themſelves would have known, if they had had ſome other opportunities of knowing them: They have had only occaſion or means to know the

+ Example

defects

defects and Ill qualities, and not the Good, and ſo perhaps on the contrary; and yet they do not obſerve ſo much, nor reflect upon it, nor attend unto this Caution. Now Men ought to paſs Judgment firſt diſtinctly, that at ſuch or ſuch a time, in ſuch or ſuch a performance or action, there appeared to them ſuch defect or commendable quality, and then from thence according to the degree of probability or likelihood in the Conſequence (which if the obſervation be but once, is oft but very ſmall) if there be juſt occaſion, to infer and conclude concerning the Qualities of the Perſon in general, as to number, degree, and conſtancy; which men commonly do all in a clutter together confuſedly. There have been Men known, who have not only once but often appeared very mean and defective, (eſpecially in ſome Circumſtances, as in Publick, in Converſation after Action, in haſte or with expedition) and yet have at that time been much more valuable, but could not ſhew it; and generally in other Circumſtances of Life, they have much exceeded

exceeded thoſe who have appeared much better at certain times.

It moſt often requires a pretty long Converſation, eſpecially to more ſlow Obſervers and Reaſoners, to know and paſs a general Judgment truly concerning a Perſon: That which is uſually ſignified by the Proverb, *Of eating a Buſhel of Salt with a Man, before one chuſeth him for a Friend.*

This is the reaſon ordinarily (to give no unuſeful Inſtance) that Men are often judged in general better or worſe than they are by their Diſcourſes and Books. If a Perſon hath wrote a Book in which there hath appeared ſomewhat conſiderable of Piety or Vertue, or Judgment, or Wit, or other Good quality, he is generally thought more ſuch in more things, and more conſtantly than he is, whereas there is ſet down his Thoughts and Inclinations which are more rare; whence alſo greater expectations from him in his Diſcourſe, Converſation, Employment, than are reaſonable; and ſometimes upon their obſerved failure, greater

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contempt and under-valuing of him; ſometimes (as when the Judger follows common Opinion and Teſtimony, as moſt do) an undue admiration and approbation of all he ſaith and doth. The like on the contrary; when Men for ſome too light or ſatyrical, or obſcure Speech or Book, are judged more careleſs, trivial, ill-natured, or confuſed in more things, and more conſtantly than indeed they are. All which ſeems much like as if Men ſhould from one handſom or crooked-finger of a Perſon, judg confidently concerning the Beauty or Deformity of his whole Body.

Sect. X.

(2.) More particularly; an Opinion or Judgment too univerſal and unlimted, that all other Men are like our ſelves: Which as it is true ſometimes, ſo it is often falſe. This comes from actual Ignorance, or non-attention of this Rule's not being Univerſal; and that other ſigns of Mens Qualities and Tempers are to be adhibited and made uſe of,

of, and that there is great variety in Men. So oft-times we judg ſuch an Action to proceed from ſuch a Reaſon, or ſuch a Principle, or ſuch a Temper in a Man, (ſuppoſe from Self-intereſt *ultimately*, Pride, or Covetouſneſs,) becauſe it doth ſo in our ſelves, or at leaſt we are ſtrongly inclined thereto; never taking any other account of any other Circumſtances (ſuch as his former Temper, manner of Life, Actions in the like caſe, *&c.*) which might give us ſufficient reaſon to believe and judg the contrary. The ſame Action may proceed from ſeveral Principles, Ends, and Purpoſes: And very different and contrary Actions (eſpecially in divers Perſons) may proceed, and full often do from one and the ſame general Principle, and due End. So Men are apt to judge other Mens inclinations like their own, and that ſome things pleaſe others as much as themſelves; and other things are diſtaſtful, tedious, and burthenſome, becauſe they are ſo to themſelves. So many judg that the Gratification of many inordinate Appetites

petites or Luſts in us, are extraordinarily pleaſant to all Men, ſay they what they will, and Virtue and Religion is a dry ſapleſs thing to all Men; nothing of Pleaſure or Delight to all thoſe that profeſs it, but that it is taken up or pretended to, for ſome other particular Ends, and that they would be otherwiſe if they dared, and would be glad to be rid of the burthen, or freed from the confinement thereof; and that therefore they are Hypocrites: And from the ſame cauſe are frequent falſe Judgments on the Good ſide, and Perſons and Actions are often judged better than they are, which is the better extream. In ſo much that very oft very Good-minded Men cannot believe that Men are ſo wicked as they are, that they are ſo Selfiſh, Unjuſt, Fraudulent and Deceitful, Perjurious, Filthy, and Senſual, Impious and Atheiſtical, as indeed they are, and ſo are as often cozened in their dealing with them, and oft-times give their Commendation and their Charity where they are not deſerved.

This

This is ſo general a Cauſe of Errour in our Judgments concerning Perſons, that we extend it to God Himſelf, and it takes place very frequently in our judgments concerning God Himſelf. So Men judg Him not ſo much to love Holineſs, to hate or diſapprove of Sin and Vice, and conſequently that He will not ſo much take care to reward the one, or ſeverely to puniſh the other: No, He'll be Kind and Merciful, and let them alone, and Indulge them to take their pleaſure as they will, or at leaſt He will not be ſo hard to Torment or Puniſh them for what's paſt; and all this becauſe they are ſo diſpoſed themſelves, and they for their parts are very indifferent to Virtue or Vice, and would let Men alone to pleaſe themſelves therein; they ſee no great reaſon why they ſhould trouble themſelves or others there-about. Like thoſe wicked Perſons, *Pſal.* 50. 21. *Theſe things haſt thou done, and I kept ſilence: Thou thoughteſt that I was altogether ſuch a one as thy ſelf, but I will reprove thee, and ſet them in order before thine eyes.*

Thus

Thus ſome Men think God Envious as it were, and if not delighted, yet content with His Creatures miſery for His own Pleaſure *ultimately*. They think Him Arbitrary, and Pleaſing Himſelf *ultimately* in the exerciſe of His Power, and this becauſe they themſelves are ſo, or at leaſt inclin'd to be ſo. And one, yet further, Reaſon of this, is Men's *ultimate* Self-love, whereby they are inclin'd to, and do actually judg many things in themſelves good Qualities and Perfections which are not, and conſequently attribute them to God, whom all Men naturally judg to poſſeſs all Perfection: Which is true, ſuppoſing the Perfection doth not neceſſarily infer or involve ſome Imperfection: A thing which is of great uſe to be taken notice of.

The ſame hath been one reaſon of ſome Men's (the Heathens at leaſt) Idololatrical making Images, and corporeal Repreſentations of God in Humane ſhape; *viz.* They have judged God in this reſpect in Form and Shape like themſelves, and this out of Self-

love

love, together with a natural Proneneſs to conjoyn things, which uſe to be in our Perceptions and Judgments conjoyned: Such as is a rational Soul and Spirit joyned with a Body of Humane ſhape, for which cauſe among others, Angels and Cherubims are ſo pictured. This is obſerved by *Cicero*, in the Perſon of *Velleius* the Epecurean, *Lib.* 1. de natura Deorum. *Quod vero ſine corpore ullo vult* [Plato] *Deum eſſe, ut Græci dicunt* ἀσώματον, *id quale eſſe poſſit intelligi non poteſt, careat enim ſenſu, careat prudentia, careat voluptate neceſſe eſt, quæ omnia Deorum notione comprehendimus*, i. e. Plato's Opinion, *That God hath no Body, cannot be underſtood: For then He muſt want Senſe, Prudence, Pleaſure, which we comprehend in the notion of the Gods.* And again, *Quod ſi Omnium animantium formam vincit Hominis figura, Deus autem animans eſt; ea profecto figura eſt quæ Pulcherrima ſit Omnium. Quoniamque Deos Beatiſſimos eſſe conſtat, beatus autem eſſe ſine virtute nemo poteſt, nec Virtus ſine ratione conſtare, nec ratio uſquam in-*

esse nisi in hominis figurâ, hominis esse specie Deos, confitendum est. To this purpose: *That if Humane shape be better than that of any other Animal, and God be an Animal, then He must needs have the best and the most Beautiful. And because God is a most happy Beeing, and He cannot be Happy without Virtue, nor have Virtue without Reason, nor can Reason be any where but in a Humane shape, therefore God is of that shape too.* So *Cotta*, the Academick, in his reply to *Velleius*: *Homini homine nihil Pulcrius videri, blandam enim conciliatricem esse naturam & lenam sui*, i. e. *Man, indeed, thinks nothing more Beautiful than himself; so Nature flatters it self.* *Herodotus* in his *Clio*, relating that the *Persians* made no Statues, nor Temples, nor Altars to their Gods, but that they counted them Fools who did so; gives this Reason in his Opinion, *viz.* *Because they did not think the Gods to be* Ἀνθρωποφυέας, *sprung from Men, and consequently (I suppose) not of their shape, as the Greeks did.* Whether this Proneness to judg God like our selves out of Self-

Self-love, uſe and cuſtom of conceiving and judging, hath been the cauſe of making Images, and corporal Repreſentations of God, or ſomething in God by Humane ſhape, among Chriſtians or no: Yet, I think, there is but too much Reaſon to believe, that the judging God like Mens-ſelves, hath been but too much the effect of it, eſpecially among the Vulgar: I am ſure it hath a very great natural tendency thereto. And the effect (it is probable) would have been much more, if it had not been hindred by the Chriſtian Doctrine, (which notwithſtanding ſome have kept thoſe in Ignorance of, who have in this reſpect moſt need of it) and eſpecially by the Admonitions and juſt reproaches of thoſe whom theſe Patrons of Images as faſtuouſly, as fooliſhly, and falſly call Hereticks. A cuſtom and uſage ſo ſottiſh and childiſh, that never any who had their Religion from the True God, or who had any notion of His Spiritual and Infinite Nature either among *Jews* or *Heathens*, pretended any ſufficient reaſon for, (as the

inſtruction of the Vulgar, &c.) or did not contemn and deride it, until ſome Chriſtians in the times of the greateſt Ignorance and Corruption of Manners, within ſome few Hundreds of years, introduced it into the Chriſtian Church. But to return from this Digreſſion.

In Opinions and Perſwaſions: Some even of the better natured Perſons oft judg, that Men cannot be of ſuch a perſwaſion but out of ſome ill diſpoſition of Will, and ſuch a particular one too, *viz.* Self-intereſt; that is, it is for ſome deſigned good to themſelves (beſides the being in the Truth) ſo to be perſwaded; and this becauſe they find themſelves inclin'd thereto, and if they were of ſuch perſwaſions it would be from ſuch Cauſes: Not conſidering want of Information, Ineptitude to apprehend things any other way but as they have been accuſtomed, a great uſage of themſelves ſo to conceive and judg, may be the cauſes of ſuch really falſe Opinions of theirs. Nor do I ſee it a thing but very generally to be determined, how far a true Lover of the Truth

Truth, or an Honeſt-man in this particular, may err and miſtake. Though I think too on the other hand, very oft-times other Cauſes of falſe perſwaſions are alledged, beſides ſome naughty diſpoſition of Will, when it is not ſo, or but in ſmall meaſure, and this alone hath the greateſt Influence indeed.

Sect. XI.

(3.) Too general a belief of every Teſtimony or Report, whether in Talk or Books, which proceeds oft-times again from meer actual Ignorance, or Non-attention, that moſt Reports are moſt-what very fallible ſigns of what's true, and ſometimes none at all: That there are much better Proofs of things ſometimes from contrary Teſtimonies of better Perſons, ſometimes from other things. This proceeds alſo from love of Activity and Curioſity, of Knowing and Judging ſome-what new and freſh, and ſome-times from the worſer Principles ſo often named. All Teſtimonies are more or leſs ſigns of

what's true, according as the Perſons are more wiſe and knowing, or more veracious willing and careful to ſay no more than they know: Now how many Actions of Perſons reported to be done with certain Circumſtances, and from certain Principles and Reaſons, by thoſe who neither do, nor can know any thing of them: Or if they do, yet through temerity, raſhneſs, and precipitancy, curioſity, ſuſpition, envy, flattery, or ſome other diſpoſition of Will, do ſo either invent or change, by adding or detracting or ſubſtituting, that ſometimes none at all, moſt-what but little, rarely very much of what they ſay is true and to be believed. But yet what more ordinary than for Men to believe all without ſtick or ſcruple. The further too ſtill Reports go, through the more Perſons they paſs, they are ſtill the more uncertain, becauſe ſtill the more alteration; and as it rarely happens for Perſons who obſerve things by their own ſenſe or reaſon, to report them juſt as they obſerved them, through forgetfulneſs or raſhneſs: (Beſides that they

they might not discern some Circumstances.) So it is as rare and seldom for the same things to be convey'd from any one to another exactly, without some alteration. I believe that the more Cautious and Wise, cannot but have observed, that in almost all Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons, their Actions, Principles, Qualities, or Tempers, either the things are quite false, or but some general part of them true. The more Cautious and Discreet, Honest, and lovers of Truth we observe Men to be; the more we may in their Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons, either on the Good or Bad side, defer to them of our Belief and Judgment of the truth of what they say; and these in any degree considerable, are but too few. A good short *Memorandum* of this particular is that excellent Precept, μέμνησο ἀπιστεῖν. Remember to unbelieve or disbelieve, *i. e.* Either to suspend thy Belief, or to believe the thing to be false.

Sect. XII.

(4.) A fourth Cauſe of our falſe Judgment on either the Good or Bad-ſide, is our attention to, and taking notice of, or obſerving only either the good or bad Actions or Qualities, Perfections or Imperfections of Men, together with their Effects and Conſequences; and not both. Whence it comes to paſs, that thoſe Perſons in whom we attend to nothing or little but what is Good, (which is ſtill the better extreme) we judg much better than indeed they are; and thus it is uſually in our Judgments of our Selves or our Friends, or thoſe we love and favour: But on the contrary, thoſe in whom we attend to, or obſerve what is bad or imperfect only, their bad qualities or actions, the bad effects and conſequences of theſe; and not at all or but little of what is Good, we judg them much worſe than they are: Judg them to have done a great many and very bad actions, to have a great many and very bad qualities;

lities; but none or very few good. This as it is the moſt miſchievous, ſo it is the more frequent extream. Men being now ſo far from that Humane and Chriſtian temper of univerſal Kindneſs and Good-will, that they are but very few they care for, or to whom they are diſpoſed friendly, in compariſon of thoſe they do not. This again may ſometimes proceed from meer neceſſary Ignorance and want of Information. For ſometimes a Man may have ſeen, or otherwiſe known much Good by a Man, and none or little bad; either becauſe the Man wanted his proper Temptation, or through diſſimulation of his temper and inclination, or for other reaſons: And on the contrary, a Man by himſelf or others, may know many bad things by a Perſon, and little Good; when he may have much in him which he had never the opportunity to obſerve, or the Means otherwiſe to know. But it moſt-what proceeds from ſome undue diſpoſition of Will, and when a Man is partially, not juſtly affected to Perſons, and as he ought;

ought; he is either pleaſed or diſpleaſed with Perſons, more than in general he might obſerve them to deſerve or merit. Thus you ſhall but too often ſee (to give Inſtances of that ſide which is moſt to be avoided) that Men will take more notice of, and better remember one bad Action in a Perſon, than twenty good ones; and conſequently *this* ſhall procure him more Diſreputation or Diſeſteem, than *they* ſhall honour or good-will: So ungrateful and ill-natur'd a thing, is but too much of the World: Whereas we ſhould ſay, ſuch or ſuch a thing indeed, at ſuch a time is amiſs, bad or evil; but then 'twas but once, or ſeldom perhaps; nay, I know it is oftner otherwiſe, and he hath ſuch or ſuch good qualities, there he is to be commended, that is or was well done. And this ſhould be done not to ſooth Men up, or to make them content and ſo well-pleaſed with themſelves, notwithſtanding many ill Actions, Vices, and Imperfections, as not to endeavour to prevent, reform and amend them too; but to encourage them

them ſo to do; ſince they have ſo much Good in them already: And to make ones Counſel or Reproof more effectual; ſince this ready taking notice and approbation of what's Good in them, is an Argument of an impartial Love, Charity, and Kindneſs to them in the Perſon exhorting or reproving. And here I'le only add by the way, becauſe it is a thing of frequent and great uſe in Humane life, that it is the ſame kind of Cauſe of our falſe Judment of the Goodneſs or Evilneſs of things, *viz.* We only obſerve and attend to either the Conveniencies or Inconveniencies, theGood or Bad effects of things, but not to both together; which is oft from meer Ignorance, oftner from ſome Paſſion. We may obſerve it every where in publick Conſtitutions, in Domeſtick, Private and Perſonal affairs. Whence oft-times we hurry and haſte to mend things for the worſe, and are diſcontent, ill at eaſe, make our ſelves unhappy, repine, murmur, are unthankful to God unjuſtly, and without reaſon; and yet after ſome experience of the con-

contrary Inconveniences we are running back again, with many other miſchievous and hurtful Conſequences. Oft-times too on the other hand, we will not ſtir to mend things, taking notice only of their Conveniencies, and not of their Inconveniencies, which might without greater be redreſſed. The firſt generally is the defect of thoſe who affect Novelty: The ſecond of thoſe who affect Antiquity, *i. e.* Who inordinately and immoderately love them; either abſolutely for themſelves without reference to any good uſe or effect, or more than what they can really contribute to any ſuch good uſe, doth deſerve. The firſt is commonly the temper of Young-Men; the ſecond of Old: In the one being an immoderate appetite of Activity; in the other of Eaſe.

Sect. XIII.

(5.) A fifth Cauſe is want of a prevalent love of Truth. Men moſt-what in their Judgments and Diſcourſe concerning

cerning Perſons (nor is it much leſs in things, witneſs the generality of Books) look more at other things, little or not at all at the truth of what they judg or ſay; they take little heed whether it be really true or no, and therefore ſeldom examine, ſuſpend, or pronounce doubtfully, or according only to appearing probability. It is true, they ſay, and think things to be true, very confidently and ſtrongly, but this not becauſe they ſee the truth of what they affirm, but becauſe they would have it true. Not becauſe their Underſtanding and Perception goes before their Judgment, and their natural affection to Truth makes them ſo judg, but ſome other diſpoſition of will; ſuch as I have ſo often named, Activity, Curioſity, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Anger, Contempt, Flattery, &c. Whereas we ſhould be very careful to poſſeſs our Minds with ſuch a ſerious love of the Truth, that we may have a conſtant reverend regard thereto in all our Judgments and Speeches concerning others. And this we ſhould do without much

trouble

trouble, if we uſed our ſelves thereto, and did but uſe to check our ſelves, and ask the Queſtion, and pauſe a little whether we know it to be true or no. We ſhould love not only to ſpeak truth with our Neighbour, but of our Neighbour too. We ſhould look upon Truth as a moſt Sacred thing, ever to be inviolable and to be the main, if not the only perfection of our Judgments; without which we had better have none at all. We had better be utterly Ignorant, and never judg at all, than do it erroneouſly: For by that means our Actions and Reſolutions are determined and directed amiſs, and are miſchievouſly made uſe of. For were it not much better that we were ignorant, and paſſed no Judgment at all of Perſons, either of the quantity or quality of their Perfections and Imperfections, than by being miſtaken therein ſometimes to neglect or puniſh the Innocent and Well-deſerving, and to be Beneficent and beſtow good things upon thoſe that ill deſerve, and make ill uſe of them. In few words, Men judg falſly

becauſe

becauſe they will not judg truly, or are not pleaſed therewith, or at leaſt but little and in ſuch degree only that it is not effectual. For it is not every degree of love to the Truth, that will ſecure a Man from falſe Judgments of things, and here of Perſons: But it muſt be a greater degree of Love thereto, than to the thing which at any particular time may be a temptation to the contrary. And if we would be always ſecure, we muſt have a ſtronger Affection thereto than to any other Object, which may occur in our Lives, more than to the favour or good-will of the Greateſt or Beſt, more than to Miſchievouſneſs, Superiority, either in Reputation for, or Poſſeſſion of any Good thing, more than to Power or Greatneſs, more than to Gain or Riches, finally any other good Advantage or Intereſt. We muſt look upon our uprightneſs or truth of our Judgments or Opinions, as a far greater proper Good, a richer and more excellent Poſſeſſion than all theſe; whereby we do more Good than by all theſe without it. And

con-

conſequently be more ſhamed and afraid to be Erroneous, and live in Falſhood and a Lye, than any other evil or hurtful thing to us, except Vice and Sin.

We muſt in a general ſenſe, *Buy the Truth, and ſell it not:* That is, prefer it before all other things that are inconſiſtent with it, and cauſe us to part with it, *alſo Wiſdom, Inſtruction, and Underſtanding*, the means to obtain it, *Prov.* 23. 23. If we do not do thus, if we be not thus tempered and diſpoſed, if we do not judg this a greater good; we ſhall have our Judgments affected, ſtrengthened, bent, and determined by our love to other things in all Matters, where there is not apparent demonſtration, but only high degrees of Probability; as it is almoſt in all affairs of Humane life. Nay, even in theſe a Man may wilfully blind and confound himſelf, or divert his attention; and if not make himſelf judg falſe, yet at leaſt hinder himſelf from clearly ſeeing and judging truly, and make himſelf doubt as it were; ſaying, when a thing cannot be denied, Truly, I do not know

know, or the like; and in ſuch a manner ſhuffle and contrive to bring himſelf at leaſt to ſuſpenſion and doubt and confuſion. Every Man hath ſome degree of love to Truth naturally, ſome more, ſome leſs, more than ſometimes to more, ſometimes fewer other things; and accordingly they are more likely, more often to judg truly. But it is and muſt be a greater degree than to all other things univerſally and conſtantly, that will always ſecure from all prejudices of his will.

Sect. XIV.

(6.) The ſixth Cauſe I ſhall name is our Paſſions, both thoſe of the Concupiſcible and Iraſcible appetite, as they are uſually called: Or more plainly, thoſe that have good, and thoſe that have evil for their immediate Object. Such as are the ſimple ones of Love, Hatred, Joy, and Grief, and Deſire: And others compounded of theſe, as Revenge, Anger, Hope, Fear, *&c.* Theſe all in every Caſe, cauſe us to

judg to the advantage, and in favour of themſelves; that is, ſo as they may be preſerved and maintained, the Inſtances of which are every-where, and innumerable. Thus for Example: Love cauſeth us to attribute to the Object beloved things that are lovely, whereby the Paſſion is maintained or encreaſed; and hatred on the contrary, to attribute, or aſcribe, or adjudg to the Object hated thoſe things that are hateful and evil, for its own preſervation or encreaſe, whereby it is kept up or augmented, and made more keen and fierce: And all this without any regard to the truth or falſhood of what is judged. So likewiſe what we deſire, we will think it is good Poſitively or Privatively. In deſire properly ſo called, or where the good we deſire, is a poſſeſſion of ſome good thing, we moſt readily judg the good thing a great Good, and conſequently its Poſſeſſion. In Anger and Revenge, where the good thing deſired is a removal of ſome evil or grievous thing to us, by doing evil to it (which ~~obtains in~~ may be to Inanimate things, but prin-

principally ~~in~~ to Perſons) we are extraordinarily prone and forc'd to judg this removal a greater good, and in order thereto the evil to be removed a mighty evil. And therefore more particularly in Perſons to whom we are thus affected or paſſionated, we judg many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them, many or all, perhaps more than indeed there are, which are ſeldome but very confuſedly apprehended, and ſignified uſually by ſome name, to which our paſſions of Anger, Hatred, or the like have been joyned, (as that of ſome Sect or Party) whereby ſtill theſe our Paſſions are gratified; that is, ſupported, maintained, nay, augmented and boyled up to the greateſt degree of Agitation and Violence. And thoſe Mens judgments thus from Paſſions, whereby they are maintained and increaſed, though they may happen to be true; yet it appears by Experience, that they are more generally falſe. Their happening to be true, ſometimes makes Men oft-times juſtifie and think well of ſuch paſſionate Judgments;

whereas the truth was not at all ſeen by them, nor was it the Reaſon or Cauſe therefore of their Judgments.

Theſe Paſſions thus byaſs, and warp, and determine our Judgments three Ways among others.

1. By bringing to mind and furniſhing our Invention only with thoſe things which maintain or increaſe them, and which are true; and keeping out the contrary, hindring thoſe from appearing which may abate or extinguiſh them, which are as true too. We all may have often obſerved how much we have preſently to ſay for a Perſon whom we love, how plentifully and readily our Invention is furniſhed; What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praiſe; How many excellent Qualities, and in what great Degree, appear to us in him, and we attribute to him. All which grant to be true. But we have nothing to ſay againſt him, nothing to his diſadvantage, nothing that is bad, imperfect, or faulty in him appears, or comes to our mind; when as much might as truly there have been ſaid too.

And

And ſo on the contrary (the worſe or at leaſt the more frequent extream) in a Perſon whom we hate, are revengefully and wrathfully affected to, with whom we are angry: Then how many Faults in him, or Imperfections crow'd preſently into our Minds? All his paſt bad Actions and Qualities remembred, his preſent obſerved, nay, his future too foretold; and altogether flie about immediately in our Fancies; and we could give a Catalogue ſometimes of many hours long, and make large Declamations againſt him; the Man hath been this and that, and t'other, all which we'll grant to be true too: But then, how barren are our Inventions for him, we have nothing or very little to ſay to commend him. This would be a very dry Theme for us. We remember, or take notice of nothing conſiderable in him: Whereas it may be here is as much, and as true to be ſaid by any other Perſon who is Calm and Reaſonable, not thus poſſeſſed by theſe Paſſions againſt him; nay, and we our ſelves can do it when we are out of

that Paſſion, when the Man is not altered (except it be in that one particular for which we are angry with him) he is the ſame ſtill, he is no better nor worſe, when we are, and when we are not ſo affected to him; 'tis we only alter and change. And ſo in particular Actions, how eaſily can we, by how many Arguments, commend, juſtifie, or excuſe any Action of our Friends, and with as many diſcommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adverſary, whom we are in hatred with, or bear grudge againſt, or are wrathful and angry with? Hence therefore we give falſe Judgments concerning Perſons qualities or actions; judging them much better or worſe than they are; we having only Arguments and Proofs on one ſide brought to our Mind, by our paſſions, and thoſe on the other kept out by them. Which is like, as if corrupted or bribed Officers ſhould permit no Witneſſes to come into, or appear in the preſence of the Judg, but thoſe that ſhall ſerve for that ſide or the Cauſe that they are bribed for: And yet often our Mind

and

and Reaſon, the Judg, not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of theſe Officers, the Paſſions (though it might and ſhould) may think it very truly judged; at leaſt as it ought according to the Evidence that it had; and ſet down, and be content, and think all was well done, and truly they were very honeſt and ſincere in their Judgments. This is one of the moſt ſlie and cloſe Cheats and Tricks we by our Paſſions put upon our Reaſons. The more had we need here to be cautious, and now more eſpecially when the Deceit and Cozenage is diſcovered. And both on this and the two following, as well as other accounts, it is a ſpecial Maxim of Wiſdom, not to truſt thoſe Judgments, where Paſſions have gone before Reaſon: But do one of theſe three things. Either, 1. Be calm and and have no Paſſions at all. Or, 2. If thou wilt for Invention-ſake have any, then paſſionate thy ſelf equally on both ſides. Or, 3. Raiſe up in thy ſelf a greater and commanding paſſion for Truth, which will make all the Evi-

dence and Proof thou haſt in thy keeping, appear equally on all ſides. But here I may prevent what is to be ſaid in another Head.

2. And very briefly: Our Paſſions cauſe us to judg in favour of themſelves, ~~by~~ bringing into our Minds ~~not only~~ what is true on one ſide, and keeping back what is ſo on the other, but alſo by thruſting into them more than is true: And therefore we obſerve in our Friends and in our Enemies, (that is, to whom we are ſo) more virtues or faults, fine or foul things, and more of them too than any Body elſe not alike prejudiced can ſee, or than indeed there are. And,

3. When things on both ſides do come to our Minds, as eſpecially when ſuggeſted by another, who would diſcourſe or defend the Perſon we are paſſionated for or againſt; I ſay, when this is, by thruſting them on one ſide away again, or turning a Man from them, or cauſing one wilfully not to attend to them; or if that cannot be, not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them; nay,

nay, not to be able, it confounding and agitating our Minds, and drawing their force another way: And ſo it is by every days Experience obſerved, that he that is under the paſſions of Hatred and Anger againſt any thing or Perſon, will not attend to what can be ſaid or propoſed in their Commendations or Defence; nor will nor can oftimes apprehend the Proof or Conſequence thereof. So on the other hand, Timidity, or Fear, or Scruple to judg amiſs concerning Perſons, eſpecially on the bad ſide, may cauſe many not to judg according to the beſt probability that doth appear to them, without any prejudice from any Perſon, or ill diſpoſition of Will: But this is an effect of Paſſions, more viſible and more to be obſerved by the Perſon himſelf miſjudging, than the former, and therefore in that reſpect more eaſie to be prevented. And here we ſee manifeſtly one of the principal miſchiefs of Paſſions, as there are alſo very good uſe of them; and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well.

Sect.

Sect. XV.

(7.) Another Cauſe of falſe Judgment either on the good or bad part, may be all Appetites whatſoever, beſides thoſe which have Truth and univerſal Juſtice for their Objects. By which Juſtice, I mean, nothing elſe but ſuch a love of, and deſire to do Good to each particular, as is moſt conſiſtent with, or productive, or effective of the greateſt Good of the whole; that, always with regard to, meaſured and moderated by this. I ſay, all Appetites beſides thoſe; not only thoſe which cauſe it on the bad ſide, as Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, (which two laſt ſeem mixed of the two former) and others which have been formerly mention'd; but thoſe alſo which cauſe it on the favourable ſide, as in Flattery, when a Man by paſſing his Judgment before another concerning himſelf, or his Friend, deſires to pleaſe him, and to gain his good opinion and favour; nay, partial and imprudent Charity

rity it ſelf may be the Cauſe. As when a Man having no Self-end (more than the pleaſure of the Action) in giving his Judgment concerning a Perſon to whom he hath a ſtrong inclination to do good, but without that due actual heed to, or fore-ſight of the Hurt or Evil that may come of this his Beneficence to him, or to others elſe-where, or at ſome other time, that is, partially or imprudently, judgeth him more deſerving than in truth he is.

To give particular Inſtances of falſe Judgments from theſe Cauſes would be endleſs; only one may be obſerved for Example, which is frequent and of conſequence.

Contradicting the Judgment of others, paſſing Judgments contrary to thoſe of others; and oft-times the more, by how much the Number or Reputation of thoſe others are the greater. When we ſee one praiſed or diſpraiſed by them, contrariwiſe to diſpraiſe or praiſe either in general, or quoting particulars, and multiplying and magnifying of them. Generally this is out of Pride, that

that we might Equalize, or be Superiour to others in our Invention, or Diſcretion, or Honeſty, the Abilities which fit us for Judging; that we might not at leaſt ſeem to our ſelves or others, to be inferiour in thoſe Qualities; that others might not ſeem as if they were only able and fit to do it.

In all which there is affectation of Superiority, Vain-glory, and Oſtentation, Envy; which are ſeveral Branches of Pride. And this we ſee not only among the Vulgar, and in ordinary Converſation, but among the Learned; who often when any Author is generally commended (and it may be too much) ſet themſelves to multiply and magnifie his Faults and Defects, but to diminiſh his commendable Qualities, by concealing or extenuating them. And on the contrary, when an Author is now out-done, and thought to be much exceeded by another, and therefore comparatively undervalued, they endeavour to multiply and magnifie what is Good and Deſerving in him;

him; but to neglect, conceal, or leſſen what is Bad and Defective: And conſequently by this unobſerved prejudice, they give falſe Judgments concerning them. I know theſe Inſtances may proceed from a careful Veracity and Juſtice, becauſe Men commonly both praiſe and diſpraiſe exceſſively, and their Judgments may be true; but it is more rare even to have any thing thereof, but much more rare ſtill to ſee this without ſome mixture of the other Cauſes.

And here we may juſt take notice of one reaſon of the aptneſs of Men to recriminate, to accuſe their Accuſers though never ſo Juſt and Modeſt; or preſently to quote their Infirmities and Faults, *viz.* Men know that by poſſeſſing the Perſon to whom they are accuſed with Hatred, Envy, Anger, *&c.* againſt him who accuſeth them, they ſhall cauſe him to judg confuſedly, and in general the Accuſer a bad or ſilly Perſon, and conſequently all that appertains to him, and conſequently his Teſtimony; and that therefore it is not

to

to be believed. We ſee this deſign moſt-what to take effect with the Vulgar, where there is almoſt always Revenge too.

Sect. XVI.

The Cauſes of the Fifth prohibited Judgment, *viz.* Too great a Pronenes to declare and make known our Judgments, may be and uſually are the ſame now often mentioned in ſome of the former, *viz.* Idleneſs, *ultimate* Self-pleaſing by Activity, Curioſity, Vain-conceit of ones own ſufficiency and ability to judg of others, fancied Reputation therefor; alſo by Hatred, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery: And Perſons who are too prone thus to do on the worſt ſide out of ſuch Principles, eſpecially now named, one or more of them, and are frequent and buſie in doing of it, are thoſe who are called properly Tale-bearers; concerning whom you have ſo many Adviſements in the Book of the *Proverbs*, and of

of the miſchievouſneſs of their Employment, as *Prov.* 26. 20, 22. and 16. 28. and 11. 13.

Sect. XVII.

Laſtly, For the Cauſes of Mens paſſing Judgment in Thought and Speech, concerning Perſons on the worſt ſide, out of ſuch bad Principles as are aforenamed; I have no other now to name, but only the corruption of their Natures, and inclinations thereof when born into this World, by ſome certain Cauſes, and this improved and increaſed by too conſtant an ill uſage of themſelves, their wilful compliance therewith; few taking care to correct and amend by the Grace of God, what is bad and amiſs in themſelves, their natural Degeneracy and Corruption, their Inordinacy and Immoderacy of appetite, but ſwimming down with the Stream, and doing that which is moſt eaſie.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

We have diſpatcht the Fourth General Head, the Cauſes of prohibited Judgment.

Sect. I.

THe Fifth is the miſchievous Effects or Conſequences, which are ſo many Reaſons, and ſhould be ſo many Motives to beware and to abſtain therefrom. We ſhall obſerve ſome of theſe in each particular prohibited Judgment diſtinctly.

I. Of too great a proneneſs to judg others in general, the ill effects are theſe:

1. The firſt is, That too great a Proneneſs, and Practice accordingly, to obſerve and judg others, cauſeth us to neglect our own Affairs. The more our Eyes are abroad, the leſs at home; for they cannot be in two places. We cannot

cannot mind two things at once ſo different and diſtant. And it is every where by Experience ſeen, that thoſe who little take notice of what others are and do, are uſually more attentive to their own Buſineſs, and what immediately belongs to themſelves. The time that is ſpent in Reflection upon others Actions and Principles, would otherwiſe moſt-what (if we are not very dull for want of Variety) have been converted to the obſervation of our own. Such ſhamefully neglect oft-times to purpoſe, or ſet apart their own Actions, what they will, what they will not do; and their own Principles, out of what End, and for what Reaſon, and the execution of their purpoſed Actions, that they even forget to do what they themſelves had purpoſed and deſigned, becauſe they are buſie and employed in gazing at others. *Wiſdom is before him that hath underſtanding, but the eyes of a Fool are in the ends of the Earth*, Prov. 17. 24. The ſenſe may be, That a Man of underſtanding regards and looks at more often his own

wiſdome, to ſee where he acts wiſely, out of foreſight of, and in order to good Ends; but a Fool's thoughts are roving, and employed about things far from him, the moſt remote and impertinent; that is, of Perſons and Actions (among others) which he can little make uſe of in compariſon. As the Man that looks at his own next ſteps, employs himſelf generally to better Purpoſe, than he that gazes at the *Horizon*, or bounds of the Heavens. Now the further ill Conſequences of thus doing, is this, that we transfer our Obſervation and Judgment there, where we can make leſs good Uſe, if any; and from thence, where we could have uſed it to much better purpoſe for the moſt part.

For, 1. Thou canſt not ſo well know that, concerning which thou judgeſt in another Man, as in thy ſelf, thy Judgment will be the leſs certain, and conſequently the Effects of it leſs certainly good. All our Judgments concerning others, are concerning their Qualities or Actions, and of their Actions ſometimes

times, whether they have been at all, ſometimes out of what Principle, ſometimes to what effect or good purpoſe, whether they ſhould have been done. Now, no Man can tell ſo well what Qualities are in another Man, as what are in himſelf: No man can ſo well tell the Principles of another Mans actions, his end, intention, and deſign, as thoſe of himſelf; every Man may know his own Heart better than another Mans. No Man can be ſo ſure of what is done by any Man, as the Perſon himſelf. And laſtly, It is but rare that any Man of theſe great Talkers or Judgers, know the Circumſtances of any Mans condition, and conſequently what can or ought to be done by ſuch a Perſon, ſo well as he himſelf; and ſurely he doth or may (unleſs it is becauſe he is an idle Buſie-body, or worſe) know the circumſtances of his own Actions, better than he can thoſe of another Man, and conſequently what is fitteſt to be done in his owne Caſe, better than in another Mans. Why then doth he not buſie himſelf there? *viz.* At Home.

(I ſpeak not univerſally, but for the moſt part:) For ſometimes in ſome Caſes a Man may know other Mens Affairs better than they themſelves, and than their own Affairs, and give their Judgment with Modeſty, and out of Friendſhip. Yet how frequent is it for Men, and the moſt Ignorant and Sottiſh, moſt peremptorily and confidently to judg what others who are truly Wiſe ought to do, what would be fitteſt and of beſt effect for them to do, to direct or find fault; where it is apparent *they* know little of the Circumſtances of their Condition or Affairs, and *theſe* cannot reaſonably be thought to be ſuch ſtrangers to their own Buſineſs and Affairs as not to know more, and to know better what they have to do, and ought to do; yea, and are as good to do it too. But that's another Conſideration.

2. But then, Secondly, If thy Judgment be as certain, and if another did indeed ſuch a bad Action, or out of ſuch a bad Principle, or hath any bad Quality; it may be you can contribute little

little to the preventing the like for the future, or to his amendment or help, it may be none at all, if diſtant, though thou would'ſt, he is out of thy reach, thou canſt not let him know thy Judgment, or he'll not care for it if he do; but in thy ſelf thou mayſt do much, prevent the next time, otherwiſe diſpoſe thy ſelf, nor do, nor be ſo any more, mind thy own Faults or Infirmities. Thou art without Compariſon, more ~~than~~ in thine own power to direct, alter, or change thy ſelf, than another Man is, and yet thou art very buſie about him, and negligent of thy ſelf. Which is like as if one ſhould be very ſollicitous concerning another Travelling-ma[illegible]way, and diligently obſerve whether he went right, or in a bad way (it may be to direct him too if he went wrong, it may be only to gratifie Curioſity, or to laugh at him) when he could not, or would not come at him to direct him; and in the mean time he never minded his own, and ſo perchance falls into a Slough, or Ditch, or wanders into a wrong one: Or as

if thou ſhouldſt be careful of another Mans Health, or Legs, or Eyes, which it is little in thy power to uſe when they are never ſo perfect, and neglect thy own which thou canſt uſe at thy pleaſure, and it may be have more need of being looked after, and are worſe than thy Neighbours. Or to uſe part of our Saviours own Compariſon here, to be peering into thy Neighbours Eye, and taking notice of a Mote there, when thy own Eye hath the ſame, if not a Beam: When (as our Saviour alſo Himſelf intimates here) if thou pulledſt out thy own mote or beam firſt, thou might'ſt uſe thy own ſight to help thy Neighbour; but if thou ſhould'ſt pull out that of thy Neighbours, it may be thou canſt not aſſure he ſhall ſo well uſe his clearneſs.

2. Another evil conſequence of too great a Proneneſs, and too frequent Judgment of others, (or it then is ſo) is moſt-what an Uſurpation of anothers right, (or of that which for another to have, would do moſt good) a taking from another what is his due, it is a

piece

piece of Injuſtice. For generally thoſe who give Judgment concerning others, would oblige them both to judg as they judg, and do ſo too, to do accordingly. They are apt to impoſe their Judgments; and this by all the power they have, and therefore will Inflict what evil lies in their power if they do not; which may be at leaſt Ill-opinion, diſgrace, or Ill-ſpeaking-of, even in the meaneſt Perſon. They are ſeldom content themſelves to paſs their Judgment, but they would have Perſons of whom they judg, to Judg as they do, and do as they would have them, or think fit they ſhould; and are Angry, or Ill-pleaſed if they do not: And here they would take away their Liberty of judging in their own Affairs, in acting according to their own Judgment; they would deprive them of making uſe of their own Examination and Prudence, and then of determining themſelves. But is not this every Mans Right in reſpect of private Perſons? Is it not better the Judgment and Determination of a Man's own Actions for Example, ſhould

reſt in himſelf? It is true, I may give my Judgment when deſired, or asked, or where the defect of Ignorance or Infirmity is manifeſt out of Friendſhip; but then with deferrence to the Perſons own Judgment and Determination at laſt. And this not careleſly and as being diſpleaſed, becauſe he follows not me; but with an acknowledgment of his Right, and an Acquieſcence therein. Every Man is a Prince and ſupream Moderatour to himſelf under God, in abundance of his Actions, moſt of his External, ſuch as Domeſtick ones, and Perſonal eſpecially; and of his Internal, as his willing, deſigning, Intentions, Opinions, and Judgments; and it is moſt for the Publick, or Univerſal good, it ſhould be ſo. And Men ſhould be left to the exerciſe and uſe of their own Prudence and Liberty in many things, though they ſhould not ſo well uſe it altogether as they might: The one may be a greater good, than the other an evil. Beſides, It is moſt likely, every Perſon ſhould beſt know the Circumſtances of his own, eſpecially

ally more private Actions, and conſequently what's fitteſt to be done, or not done: Or if any did better know ſometimes, and were better and more virtuous to direct; yet, How ſhould it be known when? And who would not pretend to it? So that there would be nothing but Confuſion, and every one would be every ones Lord and Maſter. And yet, I dare ſay, it is to be obſerv'd, a moſt frequent piece of Injuſtice and Tyranny, and running through all ſorts of Men, and lodged even in the Beggars breſt. Men are not content Men ſhould be Judges in any of their own affairs, even Private and Perſonal; but they will be judging, directing, reproving, urging, and forcing as much as they can, them to be, and do as they would have them, lording and domineering over others; not ſeaſonably, modeſtly, and friendly adviſing only. This gratifies and increaſeth Pride in us alſo, and this is that in part which the Apoſtle reproves, in *Rom.* 14. 4. *Who art thou that judgeſt another Man's ſervant?* Why wouldſt thou

thou be Governour of another Man, and needs have and force him, compel him to judg and do as thou judgeſt; or elſe would'ſt hate him, deſpiſe and blame him in words too, (I ſuppoſe) if he did not, when-as in this caſe, he is only ſubject to God?

Sect. II.

II. The evil Conſequences of too much Proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, (I ſpeak as to the effect only, though the Principle be not bad) ~~is,~~ are:

1. That it leads a Man to falſe Judgments, and to judg Perſons worſe than they are.

2. That it conſequently diſpoſeth a Man to Contemn, Undervalue; nay, Hate a Perſon more than he deſerves. Whence,

3. It begets Suſpicions, and belief in others, that this his Judgment comes from the worſt principles, of Self-love, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, *&c.* when it really may not be ſo. Whence

4. It

4. It diſpoſeth and gives occaſion, and is but too often an effectual temptation, both in thoſe whom he thus judgeth and others, to contempt, hatred, and revenge toward him, and that by obſerving and marking, making known and publiſhing his Faults and Infirmities too, which really are ſo; which otherwiſe they neither would nor ſhould have done; nay, by adding thereto, increaſing their number and greatneſs, and judging him worſe than he is, as the former had done by his Neighbour; whence further hatred and contempt reciprocally from them to him, and more than he deſerves too; hence again, it may be Hatred and Revenge ſtirred up in him again, againſt them. So that now, behold what a crowd and heap of Miſchief there is on all hands, inſtead of mutual Charity and Beneficence. Part of this is the Motive, our Saviour Himſelf here ſubjoyns to His Command, to abſtain from Judging, *viz. With what Judgment ye judg, ye ſhall be judged; and with what meaſure ye mete, it ſhall be mea-*

measured to you again. That is, If you judg Men otherwiſe than you ought, they'll do ſo by you again, they'll pay you in your own Coyn; Men do not uſe to be behind with one another in theſe requitals: I conceive, *That ye be not judged*, is meant of *Men*; and ſo in the next Verſe, [*Ye ſhall be judged*,] and not of *God*. For God will not judg Men otherwiſe than is Right, and as ought to be; and therefore not as Men, who judg one another otherwiſe than they ought. By the way, this Reaſon of our Saviours, was an Adage or Wiſe-ſaying among the *Jews*. So in the *Jeruſalem Targum*, or *Chaldee* Paraphraſe, במילא ראנש מכיל בר מתכיל לי׳ i. e. בין מכילא טבא בין באישא With the ſame meaſure a Man meaſures, ſhall it be meaſured to him again whether good or bad, *Gen.* 38. 24. And again, מיכילא לקביל מיקילא *i. e.* Meaſure for meaſure. So they feign *Judah* to have ſpoken to himſelf, when *Thamar* his Daughter being condemned by him to be burnt, for playing the Harlot, ſhe produced the Signet, Bracelets

lets and Staff, which he had given her, and bid him diſcern whoſe thoſe were, as a puniſhment for him, who had fraudulently asked his Father *Jacob* the ſame queſtion concerning *Joſephs* Coat, whom he with his Brethren had thrown into the Pit, and made his Father believe he was torn with wild Beaſts. This by the bye.

Sect. III.

III. The ill-Conſequences of raſh Judgment, eſpecially of Cenſure, are:

1. That it diſpoſeth, uſeth, and habituateth a Man thereto, both in his Judgment concerning Perſons, and every where elſe.

2. It renders a Mans Teſtimony very inconſiderable. For who will much heed what that Man judgeth, who is known to judg any-how, without any regard to Reaſon for what he judgeth, and conſequently any ſign of truth. It is time ill ſpent to give ſuch inconſiderate, and raſh, ſlight precipitate Perſons but the hearing only.

3. It

3. It gives occaſion to Men, of Anger, Wrath, Hatred, Contempt; they always ſuſpecting ſuch unreaſonable Judgments to come from worſe Principles than meer Vanity and Wilfulneſs, *viz.* from Malice or Envy againſt them; at leaſt concluding, and truly, that there wanted the Care and Love to their Neighbours they ſhould have had: For Men ſo well affected one to another, will rarely judg without Reaſon, to each others diſadvantage. Beſides, what ever the Principle be, the very ill effect will make Men ordinarily angry enough.

Sect. IV.

IV. The ill Conſequences of falſe Judgment, are,

1. A Man's own Diſcredit and Diſreputation, for careleſsneſs, prejudice, inability and weakneſs, to judg right and true; whence alſo a Man invalidates his Teſtimony and Witneſs, and even then when he may judg well and true. He that more often judgeth falſe

falſe than true, gives reaſon to any Man never to believe him meerly upon the accouut of his Teſtimony; and therefore not even then when he may judg true. For it is more probable (conſidering meerly the Perſons Teſtimony) that he that hath more often judged falſly than truly before, doth judg amiſs now.

2. The diſtribution of the Good or Evil that are in ones power, reward, or puniſhment, (thoſe of private Men I mean) ſuch as are Praiſe or Diſpraiſe, charity of Alms, or Chaſtiſement, good or bad Word, taking or commending to any Employment or Office gainful or creditable, or refuſing or diſcommending. I ſay, the diſtribution of theſe to ill purpoſe, *viz.* Good things to the Bad, or leſs deſerving and neglectful, or Bad to the Good and Well-deſerving.

Sect. V.

V. The ill Conſequences or miſchievous Effects of too much proneneſs, or raſhneſs, in declaring ones Judgment

ment unſeaſonably, or doing it when it ought not, Are,

1. It renders a Man contemptible, or ſome-what diſtaſtful; Either becauſe he hath not Diſcretion to diſtinguiſh between times, and to diſcern when it is ſeaſonable and of good effect, and when not, and it is better to refrain, to hold ones tongue: Or, becauſe he cannot govern himſelf, he cannot contain his inclinations, whether from meer Talkativeneſs and Buſie-bodineſs, or from ſome other worſe Principle, he is Impotent: Or, laſtly, Becauſe he will not, but out of hatred, Revenge, Wrath, or Envy, or Flattery, or the like, he chuſeth to do it, and readily takes all ſuch occaſions of miſchieving another, by poſſeſſing others with an ill or mean Opinion, and by ſtirring up the ſame paſſions and affections in them againſt the Perſon, which were in himſelf.

2. Drawing others from their own Affairs or Buſineſs, whether it be the Perſons concerned in the Judgment, or others. Such Tatlers are like idle Perſons, who will not work themſelves, not mind

mind their own Buſineſs, nor let others mind theirs: But with their ſtories concerning others wantonly divert them, or concerning themſelves fright them or accuſe them, and force them to neglect their work to anſwer them, defend themſelves, or get them away.

3. Therefore mutual ſuſpicion, diſtruſt, hatred, animoſities, ſlightings, envyings, contempts, or fooliſh eſteem, vain truſt, (if the Judgment be on the Advantageous ſide) too great and too general one of another: Nothing more ordinary than for Men upon the Whiſper, or Report of ſome ill quality, action, imperfection or infirmity of another, to conceive preſently toobad an opinion in general of him, and toø be too wrathfully, contemptuouſly, or enviouſly in general affected towards him. And it were far better generally, that Men were ignorant of one anothers faults and defects, than upon the occaſion of their diſcovery, to be ſo uncharitable and unjuſt, as they uſually are. Beſides, theſe haſty Tatlers give no time for a Perſons Amendment uſu-

ally, if he hath been faulty once. But this effect is more certain, when that which is reported concerning any one, particularly reſpects him to whom it is told: As when it is ſaid, I believe he is ſo or ſo ill affected towards you, or hath done this or that againſt you, to your prejudice. For Men here are preſently more Paſſionate, and ſooner inflam'd, as being in their own caſe, they are more ſenſible and fond of their own good; and this too much and beyond Reaſon, what ought to be, otherwiſe the Effect would not be bad.

There are few who have ſo much Charity and Humility, as to acknowledg their fault or infirmity, when truly and out of good intent, or at leaſt with no bad one, it hath been obſerved, ſpoken of, and mention'd by another; or heartily to forgive, when it hath falſly, fooliſhly, or maliciouſly been done. It is better therefore generally (and theſe things are but ſo to be taken) to give Perſons no ſuch occaſions of anger, hatred, contempt and envy, by eſpecially the declaration of a Mans

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Judgment, or of what he knows of others to their diſadvantage, but to be very ſparing in ſo doing; and in general never to do it out of any worſe Principle, than a general Charity to Men, and conſequently love to what is juſt and right; out of no ſelfiſhneſs, no hatred or contempt of the Perſon in general, but of love rather to him; out of hatred or contempt of the particular Vice, or Imperfection only; and one would be glad it were otherwiſe. And then as to our Prudence never to do it, but when ſeeing the neceſſity thereof, we are in Wiſdom as well as Charity, obliged to it. *Be not a Witneſs againſt thy Neighbour without cauſe*, i. e. Without ſome foreſeen ſo good an effect, as ought to be a cauſe thereof, *Prov.* 24. 28. And, *ver.* 17. *Rejoyce not when thine Enemy falleth: Nor let thy Heart be glad when he ſtumbleth.* And hitherto is referr'd the telling ſtories to one Perſon, of what another Perſon hath ſaid of him, or done towards him behind his back, and again to the latter, what the former hath ſaid of him. If

this be frequent, it is uſually out of Talkativeneſs, Buſibodineſs, Hatred, or Flattery, either to do a Perſon an ill turn, by ill diſpoſing his Neighbour towards him, ſetting him againſt him; or to do ones ſelf a good turn, by getting the favour of the Perſon to whom we report, as ſeeming ſo much concern'd for his Credit and good Reputation, or other Good. Though this may be done too ſometimes out of a hearty ſincere Charity and Prudence, without any *ultimate* Self-end.

Where no Wood is (ſaith the Wiſeman) *there the Fire goeth out: So where there is no Tale-bearer, the ſtrife ceaſeth*, Prov. 26. 20. As Wood is uſually conceived the cauſe of Fire, ſo ſuch Stories or Reports, whether true or falſe of one to another, are the cauſe of Strife and Contention. And, *ver.* 22. *The words of a Tale-bearer are as Wounds, and go down into the innermoſt parts of the Belly.* That is, Uſually the ſtories of ſuch Perſons affect deeply their Minds to whom they are told, with keen, ſmart, violent, and piercing

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Paſſions of Vexation, Anger, Revenge. And, *Prov.* 16. 28. *A froward Man ſendeth forth ſtrife, and a Whiſperer ſeparateth chief Friends.* Such a Perſon by his frequent ſtories, if he be believed, puts Enmity not only between Strangers, but *Friends*; not Friends only, but *chief Friends*; for ſo probably the *Hebrew* word אלוף may there ſignifie, it otherwiſe ſignifying Excellency and Superiority. A great many ſayings you have in the *Proverbs* of the like nature.

Sect. VI.

VI. The ill Conſequences of judging out of Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Anger, Contempt, *&c.* Are,

1. The increaſe of theſe Paſſions, and their Principles in our ſelves by uſe, and in others by our example, which in the degree, or ſo far forth as they habitually poſſeſs our Souls, render us unworthy of Life or Beeing. For ſo far forth we do as much Miſchief as in us lies; and ſurely as far as

we ſee, 'twere better than in that reſpect that we were out of the World. And although Self-love and Fear, may oft-times reſtrain and hinder us from being the Authors of ſuch Miſchief to our Neighbour, whereby we may be Obnoxious to humane Laws; yet there may be as much of theſe in our Hearts, as may render us deteſtable to God, whoſe Knowledg and Puniſhment we can neither conceal our ſelves from, nor eſcape. But there are infinite Miſchiefs which we are capable of doing one to another, which humane Laws cannot take notice of: In ſo much that a Place, Company, or Society, may be weary of us, and yet cannot tell how to be rid of us. Theſe diſpoſitions make us like *Dragons* and *Baſilisks*, that where ever we come, we kill, and and do miſchief with our very Breaths and Eyes. Theſe are the Frenzie, the Plague of our Souls, which make every Body very reaſonably ſhun and run away from us. Finally, ſome make themſelves hereby Enemies both to God and Men, and fit company only for

for the Infernal Spirits, whom we are moſt like; and by their being as bad as our ſelves, their company will be a very ſutable puniſhment for us. Further, one of the worſt miſchiefs of ſuch Principles and Tempers is, that by our example we infect others, and make others like our ſelves; we make to our ſelves company of the like nature to us, and to one another: We propagate it, we give occaſion to, and ſtir up the ſame Luſts and wicked Inclinations in others; we help to make them more common and ordinary, and therefore the leſs ſhameful, and the leſs ſuſpected and believed, to be ſo bad as they are.

2. It expoſeth us to the Hatred, Anger, Revenge, and Contempt of others. If theſe Qualities in us when but ſuſpected (as in our Judgment ſometimes of the worſt ſide) were the occaſion thereof, how much more when they but too evidently appear to be the principles of our Judgments? All prejudices of Judgment concerning others from *ultimate* Self-love, render us generally contemned or hated more or leſs, accord-

ing to the degree thereof that appears; at leaſt pitied by the Beſt and Wiſeſt. Nothing generally more hated than Hatred it ſelf, Ill-nature, Malignity, Pride, of which unreaſonable and unjuſt Contempt is one ſort. I ſay, it expoſeth to their hatred and contempt ſometimes juſtly, when they judg truly of us, moſt-what unjuſtly and more than we deſerve. Men ſeldom obſerve due meaſures in theſe Paſſions, ſometimes by way of Juſtice, moſt what by way of Imitation, or mixture of both: And now when we are thus affected to Men our ſelves, and they by our Example, and out of Juſtice, or Ill-nature, or both, are ſo affected to us again, and to one another: How innumerable are the Miſchiefs which are conſequent? *viz.* Juſt all that we ſee in the World, Men are properly the Cauſes and Authors of one to another. All Mens miſchievous Wills and Intentions one towards another, proceed from want of Charity, from Hatred in themſelves, or from the ſame ill Qualities in others really, or ſuppoſed and preſumed; either

either becauſe Men hate one another when it is not deſervedly, or when it is.

3. But a more particular miſchief of our judging others out of Hatred, is, their judging by way of Revenge untruly of us in general, of our Qualities, Principles, or Actions: Whence our Example in any thing that is Good in us, is rendred ineffectual, all our Actions though never ſo good, are either not taken notice of, neglected, or interpreted in the worſe ſenſe; that is, thoſe that come from never ſo good Principles, and are very natural ſigns thereof, will be deemed Signs of bad, or meer Signs and Hypocritical. It is true, this will often happen through Perſons ill-nature, and aptneſs therefore to judg on the worſt ſide, when there is no occaſion or cauſe on our part given, and then we being not able to help it at all, or not without loſs of time better ſpent, may do well to glance a little Pity, and ſo neglect and take no further notice: But when we our ſelves are the Cauſe, or give the occa-

occaſion by our uncharitable, or imprudent Judgments of others, we cannot ſpend time better than by removing them, to take away the prejudice againſt the example of any thing that is Good in our ſelves.

Sect. VII.

And thus we have run through ſome of the moſt conſiderable miſchievous Effects and Conſequences, of theſe prohibited Judgments by our Saviour; the avoiding of all which ought to be ſo many Motives to the practiſing of this Negative Duty: Nor ought the contrary good Effects of abſtaining therefrom to do leſs, *viz.* The minding our own Affairs, the employing our ſelves about our own Buſineſs, the keeping at Home, and applying our ſelves to our own proper Works and Callings, the more accurate care of our own Principles and Prudence, Hearts and Actions which we can beſt know and direct, mind and make uſe of; and not only minding our own Affairs, but permitting

ting others to mind theirs, and to be Masters of their own Principles and Actions, to examine, judg, and determine themselves, we only interposing our friendly Advice and neighbourly Counsel, when asked or desired; or when we see our Neighbour fails in his Prudence or Power in a matter of more considerable moment to him, than our time is to our selves or others; then indeed not to be too intent to our own Business, and through Surliness or Carelessness of our Neighbours concern, to refuse, or not to mind, but to knock off a little from our own Business, and lend a helping-hand; like as all Men are so good natur'd, as to leave their Shops, and Trades, or Employments a while, to quench a Fire in another Man's House, though there should be no danger to themselves, or to give a Lift to their Neighbours Horse or Ass.

But otherwise not to be busie in meddling, or tyrannical in imposing on other Men in their own Affairs, and usurping their Right. Moreover the secu-

ſecuring of our ſelves from a diſadvantageous falſe Judgment, and an unreaſonable contempt undervaluing, nay, it may be hatred of Perſons, to which that diſpoſeth us: However, from a being ſuſpected guilty of the worſt of Principles of our Judgments, and conſequently from giving occaſion and temptation to others of diſlike, Hatred, Contempt, Anger, or Revenge againſt us, and that by an unreaſonable ſeverity in their judging of us, obſerving and proclaiming of our Faults and Infirmities; nay, and more and greater than we were ever ſo unhappy as to be guilty of, or overtaken with; which otherwiſe they would have taken no notice of, conceal'd neighbourly, or excuſed. And then ſecuring our ſelves from reciprocal Anger and Wrath in our ſelves, againſt their ſo unjuſt and ill principled Judgments, to which notwithſtanding we our ſelves gave a needleſs occaſion, whence all manner of Miſchief and mutual Injuries; Thy ſecuring therefore of the Innocencie and Peace, mutual Good-will and Beneficence of each other. Again,

Again; the prevention of fooliſh, blind, unreaſonable, precipitate and raſh Judgments. The preſervation of the credit of our Teſtimony, and putting our ſelves thereby in a capacity of, ſometimes to the eaſe and conveniency of our Neighbours, determining or aſſiſting to determine the Controverſies or Differences between them. The preſervation at leaſt of the Credit and Opinion of our unprejudiced Charity, and care of our Neighbours Credit and Reputation; of the want of which we give but too juſt Suſpicion, by our raſh and inconſiderate Judgments, when on the worſt ſide. Further ſtill, the prevention of Diſcredit and Diſreputation to our ſelves, for our Careleſneſs, Inability, or Weakneſs to judg, or for our wilful prejudices by our falſe Judgments; when we were able to judg better, that is, truly; nay, when it is a thing always one of the moſt in our Power of any thing in the World. For who cannot judg, and ſay, that he knows not, if he be Ignorant, and hath no probability more on one, than t'other

ther ſide, or that it appears and ſeems to him, indeed, more probable? In which he needs never to be miſtaken, although the thing may prove contrary to what appeared to him?

Further, The ſecuring us from the Breach of the material part, at leaſt of the Ninth Commandment, *viz. Of bearing falſe Witneſs againſt our Neighbour.*

Moreover, principally the Juſt and Beneficial diſpoſing of our Kindneſſes and Favours, and the with-holding them according to the degrees of each ones Merit or Demerit, the prudent and profitable diſpenſing our Praiſe or Diſpraiſe, Good or Bad word, Recommendation or Refuſal, Charity or Chaſtiſement: Not to ſquander away fooliſhly, nay, to ill purpoſe, what Good is in our power to beſtow, and to with-hold it as unſeaſonably, when it would be to good Effect laid out.

Further ſtill; the prevention of our own being ſlighted or contemned, for want of Diſcretion, or Self-government in the uſe of our Tongue and Converſation, for unprofitable or hurtful

ful Talkativeneſs and Buſie-bodineſs, and of being grudged at for worſe Principles (ſuſpected or real) of our unſeaſonable and laviſh Declaration of our Judgments. But more conſiderable much is the prevention of mutual Animoſities, Grudges, Ill-will, Diſcords, Contentions, Strifes between Men, uſually ariſing from the ſuſpicion, or certain knowledg of one anothers ill words, actions, affections, and diſpoſitions to, and concerning each other. Which if they had been concealed, and not too haſtily been told or diſcovered, might have been repented of, and the Perſons of another mind, and ſo no need of giving warning thereof to the Perſons concern'd, and Charity and Peace had been ſtill preſerv'd and maintain'd. The Humility and Forgiveneſs of the World, is too little to bear the knowledg of Mens few faults and miſcarriages one to another, and therefore they had not need be multiplied. The prevention therefore of all the miſchiefs of Tale-bearing. Yet further, the not drawing of others from their better

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Employments, by disturbing them with false, untrue, or at least useless and trivial judgments and Reports concerning them; which although they are easily neglected, passed over, and slighted by those that are wiser and better, and well provided in the World; yet they very sensibly touch, and much affect those who are not so; of whose Good we ought, as good Neighbours and Christians, to be justly tender. Finally, and above all, the prevention of the Increase and Improvement in our selves (by using our selves to the wicked Principles of Judging, so often named) of those hellish, wicked, and base Dispositions in us, to name them now and no more, those of Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, Anger and Wrath, Flattery; which if we have any degree of wise Self-love, we shall more endeavour to secure our selves from, than from the most loathsome, tormenting, and killing Diseases of our Bodies. The prevention consequently of exposing our selves to the Hatred and Contempt of others, but too

too juſtly deſerved, and of the loſs of all the benefits of mutual Good-will, Friendſhip, and kind and loving Converſation. And laſtly, The rendring our Example effectual; that if there be any thing Good in us, it might not be at all loſt and do no Good; nay, our good Example be turned into a bad one by Mens unjuſt, (but by us occaſioned and provoked) bad Interpretations of what we are, and do.

All theſe things and many more, which might be obſerved, of the like nature, thoſe Miſchiefs of doing contrary to our Duty, and the advantages and good Effects of the Practice of it in this particular of our Judgments concerning others, ought reaſonably to make us careful of our Principles and Prudence therein, more than ordinary, *viz.* That we be not too Prone to judg others; much leſs to Judg them on the worſt ſide; to obſerve, accuſe, and condemn them, even in our Hearts; not to judg raſhly, and without all Reaſon, but our Wills; not to be Inconſiderate; not to judg falſly, but always

when we judg, to do it exactly, according to Truth as near as we can; not to babble out our Judgments at any rate, not to be too prone to do that, but to do it out of Charity always, and with Discretion and Prudence; never lastly to pass our Judgments out of the worst of Dispositions, Self-pleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Pride, Revenge, Envy, affectation of Superiority, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, &c.

CHAP. VI.

Sect. I.

WE are now come to the Remedies or Means to prevent those prohibited Judgings, of which one of the most General, And

1. Shall be to remember and attend to the great number of mischievous Effects and Consequences thereof, and then to the Causes of them. The first

firſt will diſpoſe our Wills to be averſe there-from, the ſecond will direct us to ſome means to effect our Wills. The firſt will make us willing to abſtain therefrom. The ſecond able. Call to mind therefore, and think of, as oft as thou may'ſt be in danger, how much of that time ſpent in obſerving and judging of others, might have been ſpent in Self-examination, reflection and attention to thy own Buſineſs and Affairs. How idly and unprofitably, to ſay no worſe, I employ my ſelf there, in compariſon to what I might do, if my thoughts were more at Home. How much more uprightly and prudently might I carry, and demean my ſelf in all my Actions. Again, how troubleſome and importunate it makes one Man to another, to be too frequently Checking, Controlling, Determining them in their own Affairs, to be Tyrannical and Injuring. How unreaſonable and miſchievous it is to be diſpoſed to Hate, Under-value, or Contemn Perſons, more than in impartial Judgments they deſerve, and to be conſequently the Cauſes of our

ſelves being Under-valued, Hated, Contemned there-for, and more than we deſerve. Again, the being occaſions and cauſes of Sin and Trouble, both to our ſelves and others in the World. How fooliſh is it to expoſe our ſelves to juſt cenſure for Folly, Raſhneſs, Inconſiderations, Weakneſs, Indiſcretion and Partiality, and to be neglected juſtly, and not to be fit to do any good to others by our Teſtimony? The bearing falſe Witneſs againſt our Neighbour, how ſhould it pinch and wring us, and hurt us, as much as if we nip'd or cut our own Fingers, or gaſhed our own Fleſh? What a pitiable thing is it, and miſchievous, to ſee a Man miſtakenly to ſtroke the Bad, and ſtrike the Good, becauſe he thinks well of the one, and ill of the other; juſt clean contrary to what ſhould be, and like Mad-men out of their Wits? Why ſhould any Man call upon himſelf Contempt, Hatred, Anger, or Revenge, for his weak, imprudent, peeviſh, or ill-natured Tatling his Opinion of others? How hateful a thing is it, to be the Cauſe of Ha-

Hatred, Animoſities, Grudgings, Ill-wills, Diſcords, Contentions, Wranglings and Brawlings, and miſchievous Actions between Men, to ſet the World on Fire, to be a Fire-brand? Conſider, can any Man who wiſely loves himſelf and the World, for the good of which he is made, endure, to be the Author of miſchief only, to be better out of the World than in, conſequently to ſee himſelf a conſtant Judg to condemn, and Executioner too by his Hatred, Malice, Ill-nature, Enmity, Envy and Spite, Revenge, Anger, Pride, affectation of Superiorioty in Judging, to be a Peſt and Bane to the World, and to improve theſe moſt Noxious qualities in himſelf, by Exerciſe and Uſe, and in others by the imitation of his example, and to baniſh kind and friendly Converſation? Is it not alſo brutiſh enough, and a ſign a Man hath no Mind to get any Good quality, wherein he may be an uſeful Example to others? Or if he hath, he cares not whether any be the better for it or no?

Conſider, and attend to theſe and ſuch like things, eſpecially at thoſe times when you may have moſt need, when you find your ſelves moſt prone to offend in this kind, or when upon Reflection on your ſelves at any time you find you have ſo done. And as we ſhall do well thus to learn and inform our ſelves in, and remember and call to mind theſe, or ſome of theſe ill Effects, both when we are about to do amiſs in this kind, and when we have done ſo, to prevent the like for the future, by getting our Minds againſt it; ſo that we may know how to do it, it will be uſeful to take notice of, and remember the Cauſes that we may remove them.

Shun we therefore and avoid Idleneſs; let us chuſe and mind ſome Calling of our own in particular, nor let us neglect our general Calling of ſerving God, Self-examination and Reflection, occaſional doing Good and Benificence. Have we a care of Buſiebodineſs, and meerly to be doing and talking, for doing and talking ſake, but

but always for ſome further good end. And ſo likewiſe have we a care of Curioſity, or a humour and deſire to obſerve and know every thing, though moſt Remote from us, and Impertinent to any good uſe or deſign we can put it to, meerly for the obſervation and knowledg ſake; and it is no matter where the things be never ſo ſmall and trivial, and in others (as they will be for moſt part) too, ſo it will gratifie that Humour in us, and that is all we care for. Secure we our ſelves from this Childiſh temper, and if we deſire to obſerve and know things, let them be Profitable and of Concernment, and thoſe which we may make beſt uſe of, and that is, be ſure, what is in our ſelves. Let us have a care alſo of that particular branch of Pride, *viz.* Affectation to know and direct others in their own Affairs and Actions.

But moſt Induſtriouſly let us eſchew and flee the gratification of our ſelves, by the hatred of others and revenge. Far be this from us, and Pride and fooliſh affectation of Superiority, and therefore

envy, fury wrath and anger againſt Perſons in general, as alſo Contempt, the moſt common Cauſes of Detraction and Slander. Let them not come near us, nor enter in the leaſt within any the doors of our Breaſts. Flattery too and *ultimate* baſe fear of any ones diſpleaſure, or ſeeking of their favour, we muſt alſo deſpiſe and ſcorn, which doth ſo much betray us oft-times to Judgments on the worſt ſide of ſome, that we might pleaſe others; let us be ſure to inform our ſelves as well as we can, when we judg concerning others, and not do it ignorantly. And more particularly, let us have a care we do not too generally conclude all Perſons like our ſelves, nor ſuffer our ſelves to be abuſed by publick Report or Teſtimony, and judg all true what we ſo receive; make always an allowance one way or another; at leaſt moſt generally ſuſpect and doubt till further Examination, if it be worth the while. Let us have a care of that kind of Partiality, whereby we obſerve and take notice but of one ſort of Qualities or Actions

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in Men, none but their Good, or none but their Bad, as they are our Friends, or Foes, as we are well or ill affected towards them; but let us be free and indifferent to ſee both Faults and Imperfections in our Friends, and Virtue, and what's good and laudable in our Enemies. Let us ſtir up and maintain always in our Minds a ſtrong habitual love of the Truth, which will be by and by a more particular Inſtruction. Hardly any thing of more good effect in this buſineſs, than the government of our Paſſions, to remove, calm, quiet them, if you intend to paſs any conſiderable Judgment as to Truth, *viz.* Love, Hatred, Admiration, Contempt, Revenge, Anger, and the like; ſuffer we not our Minds and Memories to be Brib'd by theſe, to admit only what can be ſaid on one ſide, and not of another; nay, more than can or ought to be ſaid, and to thruſt upon us what is not true, and thruſt out again what is or may be true, becauſe againſt them; ſuffer we not our Minds to be ruffled and confuſed by them, and not to be able

able, and willing not to attend to the evidence of what we would not have to be True, or would have to be Falſe, though never ſo manifeſt: For what can be expected from us of Truth and Juſtice in our judgments concerning others, when we are ſo affected? And laſtly, Let us ſeriouſly endeavour to Reform, Correct, Amend the Corruptions and bad Inclinations of our Nature, that *ultimate* Selfiſhneſs, ſeeking our own ſelves without any regard to the good of others, nay, with an expreſs contempt thereof, and by their miſchief or hurt; as if their good were not Good, as well as mine; hence conſequently Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, cauſleſs Anger, Flattery: Seek we, I ſay, to cure our Nature by Obſervation, Caution, Endeavour, and God's Aſſiſtance. Thus if we take but heed to, and remember theſe and all other which are the Cauſes of our too buſie, diſadvantageous, raſh, ſelfiſh, falſe, malicious, proud, envious, wrathful, contemptuous, flattering

ing Judgments of others, and remove them, we ſhall certainly prevent the Effect.

But more particularly, I ſhall recommend to you ſome Remedies, which follow.

Sect. II.

2. And therefore ſecondly, But more particularly poſſeſs we our Hearts and Minds throughly, with an univerſal Charity and Benignity to all, with a proneneſs and readineſs to do Good any where, but only where we ſee (and therefore in ſome Circumſtances, as where the thing concerns many, and is not ſo ſoon known, to conſider and deliberate) it will be neceſſarily the cauſe of a greater Evil; which will in general extraordinarily ſecure us. Nor let us ſuffer our ſelves to be beaten from this temper of Mind by any ill carriage, miſdemeanor, folly or injury of others. Let us ſtill retain a true love of Benevolence for the Perſon, whatever our Keenneſs be againſt the Vice or Imperfection.

fection. Say ſtill with thy ſelf, what pity it is Perſons ſhould be ſo much their own and others Enemies, as to be guilty of any voluntary Wickedneſs; but if it be an Imperfection out of their power, then more need ſtill to be pitied and relieved by us, if we be not employed in things of greater concernment. This will diſpoſe us to diminiſh, abate, or connive at, and look off the Infirmities or Imperfections of others, and therefore either judg favourably, or not at all; except, where (as I have oft ſaid) our mutual, Chriſtian, common and univerſal Charity and Prudence, obligeth and ſtirreth us up, provoketh us to do otherwiſe.

Sect. III.

3. Rivet ſoundly into thy Mind the love of Truth; let nothing whatſoever cauſe thee to be out of the Truth, ſcorn to feign, judg raſhly or falſly concerning the worſt diſpoſed and affected Man towards thee, *i. e.* Contemn this Quality, but not out of a haughty Pride,

Pride. *i. e. Ultimately*, becauſe it is thine own Imperfection: But out of an univerſal common Charity, *i. e.* Becauſe of all the Miſchief, it is the cauſe of both to thy ſelf and others. And, indeed, there is ſome reaſon why here thou ſhouldſt leſs do this; becauſe if he be faulty and imperfect indeed, there is; but too much true already, why ſhouldſt thou make an addition?

Sect. IV.

4. And yet more particularly, ask thy ſelf again and again, (eſpecially in Judgments of more Concern and Importance) whether or no thou be ſure that thy Judgment be true: Stay not till another ask thee how thou knoweſt. For then for thy Credit and Reputation, leſt thou ſhouldſt ſeem to have ſaid any thing raſhly or untrue, or out of bad Principles, thou'lt be tempted to invent ſomewhat falſly, and to feign and alledg ſomewhat, it may be, true, but inſufficient, and yet perſwade thy ſelf, or at leaſt ſeems to him that asks thee, that

that it is good proof. But do this privately, or tacitly thy ſelf, when thy Credit may not prejudice thee againſt the Truth, but engage thee to it. And if it happen thou ſhouldſt have overſhot thy ſelf, be moſt ready to Retract it, and acknowledg ſo much. Ask thy ſelf I ſay, how thou proveſt it. And when thou doeſt, ſuppoſe, thy ſelf before the moſt impartial perſon, who hath no particular reſpect to any perſon or perſons, that is inconſiſtent with Truth and Juſtice, one that loves thee and the perſon thou judgeſt, and every body elſe; (and ſome ſuch it may be thou mayeſt have known in the World, be ſure God is ſo) whether thou thinkeſt he would admit of the proof and evidence for what thou affirmeſt or ſayeſt as ſufficient. Then again, ſuppoſe thy ſelf in the ſame caſe with the Perſon thou judgeſt, and he in thine to judg thee: Whether wouldſt thou be content he ſhould judg ſo of thee, as thou doſt of him now? Whether doſt thou think that if he had thy Proof only for what he ſaid concerning thee, thou wouldſt think

think it ſufficient, and aquieſce, and grant that he had good Reaſon for what he ſaid? If thou ſhouldſt be afraid to remit the cenſure of thy Judgment to an impartial Perſon, who neither hoped nor feared any thing from thee, and was above that, but thou ſhouldſt ſuſpect he would not judg as thou doſt, if it were but for a ſmall Wager, if thou wonldſt not be content thy Brother ſhould judg of thee in the ſame manner, and for the like reaſons (and be ſure either thou doſt not raſhly ſay, and fiercely thou wouldſt, when if it come to be done thou wouldſt not) if thou ſhouldſt find this I ſay; this ſure would put a check to thy Judgment, and make thee ſomewhat aſhamed thereof: But if thou didſt it in the greateſt ſincerity, then thou mighteſt and wouldeſt proceed to judg with more confidence and freedom, becauſe thou findeſt thy ſelf free from any ill Principles; and yet more particularly that thou mayſt try thy own ſincerity.

Sect.

Sect. V.

5. Ask thy ſelf whether thou would'ſt not have true, what thou judg-eſt concerning others, whether thou would'ſt as willingly it ſhould be falſe; nay, ſuppoſe it be on the worſt ſide, thou art rather inclin'd it ſhould not be true, or that thou art (conſidering that abſolutely without any further reſpect) ſorry it is true, and wouldſt alter the caſe if it were in thy power. Theſe things will principally ſerve to ſecure us from raſh and falſe Judgments, eſpecially thoſe of the worſt ſide.

Sect. VI.

6. Uſe thy ſelf much to dwell at Home, that is, to make thy ſelf, or ſomething more immediately appertaining to thee, the Object of thy Obſervation; and particularly then when thou doſt judg another, or art about to do it, caſt a quick eye back upon thy ſelf, whether thou, it may be, art not guilty

guilty of that which thou condemneſt in another, or would'ſt not be if thou wert in their Circumſtances, it may be more; for aſſuredly it is a very ordinary thing. As for example, It is moſt frequent to judg and condemn others for Pride and Covetouſneſs, out of Pride and Covetouſneſs; or reflect whether thou art not guilty of as bad. Thus doing will oft-times find us more and better work at Home in our ſelves, and ſo conſequently will keep us from uſing our Obſervation and Judgment abroad, which then is too much, when it might be better employed nearer hand in our own ſelves. This will alſo reſtrain us from judging falſly and raſhly, and pronouncing our Judgment without neceſſary ends of Charity. For we are generally inclin'd to be aſham'd, when we attend to it, to do that in another's caſe, which we would not have done in our own. Now when we obſerve our own Faults or Imperfections, we find we are not very willing (at leaſt not gladly be ſure) to look upon them, we are loth to acknowledg them,

or judg our ſelves guilty of them, we ſhift, we apologize, excuſe, or if we can, deny; be ſure we'll have Reaſon and Truth evident (for the moſt part of us, I except ſome diſcontented Perſons with themſelves) before we conclude againſt our ſelves: Why then ſhould we not ſo do by others, as we do by our ſelves? I know no Reaſon but it is as juſt in one, as in the other caſe.

Sect. VII.

7. Have a ſpecial care of all Paſſions in Judgments, eſpecially of Anger, the moſt boyſterous and rude one. Let theſe not precede, but always follow Reaſon, that ſo they do not bribe, or prejudice, or deceive even Reaſon it ſelf, as I have heretofore more particularly told you how they may, and then that they do not confound it. Paſſions, they either prejudice or blind our Judgments. The experience of this is ſo frequent, that there is none but may have obſerved the numerous miſcarriages of Judgments from hence. And in order to this

this means, let us keep our Minds ſober and calm towards others, have a care of uſing them to be affected with Paſſions immediately before Reaſon upon every occaſion. Some you may obſerve, whoſe Minds are like Tinder, or Gun-powder, which take fire always at every ſpark. And in order hereto again, uſe we Temperance and Sobriety, with moderate exerciſe, not too violent, fierce, and active, that our bodily temper may be leſs ſubject to them, leſs confus'd, dull, and yet fierce. Too much Drink eſpecially, and violent and frequent bodily Exerciſe and Action diſpoſe much to Confuſion, and Paſſions, and raſh Actions, and conſequently to blind raſh Judgments. We moſt-what ſee ſuch Perſons more Talkative, Medling, Opinionative, and Peremptory, and rudely and careleſly, or Proudly and Huffingly ſay any thing of others, though never ſo innocent and their Betters, and very uncivilly ſullying their Names with their foul Breath. This will ſecure you from raſh and falſe Judgments.

Sect. VIII.

8. More particularly, be ſparing moſt to give thy Judgment concerning a Perſon thou findeſt thy ſelf inclin'd to hate or be angry with: Suſpect thy ſelf, refrain, for thou wilt be prejudic'd even undiſcernedly to thy ſelf. Or if Circumſtances ſhould neceſſarily require thy Judgment, remember how thou art affected, ſet thy ſelf to ſhake off that prejudice; ſay all thou canſt for the Perſon firſt in thy thoughts, and be paſſionated againſt thoſe Paſſions and the Prejudice of them, that thou ſhould'ſt thereby be ſo cozen'd and deceiv'd thy ſelf, and ſo unjuſt to others. This will give check always to the bad Principles of our Judgments ſo often named, and prevent alſo many raſh and falſe Judgments.

Sect. IX.

9. Diſcourſe more of Things than Perſons. Thus we have ſuggeſted to you

you ſome remedies to prevent or amend the Miſcarriages in our judging concerning others. I deſire you would remember and make uſe of them, and try their Efficacies, and conſequently prevent the many great and frequent Miſchiefs, of which they are the Cauſes, and contribute conſiderably to the Peace and Innocency of the World.

CHAP. VII.

Sect. I.

WE are now in the laſt place to obſerve to you ſome few Rules to be made uſe of in our Judging others, *viz.* generally, and for the moſt part. For it is rare that any rule of Prudence, or the uſing any certain Means to obtain our due End of Univerſal Charity, is Univerſal and never to be receded from.

1. Which cannot be too often named,

and the moſt general is: Paſs and declare all thy Judgments out of Charity; that is, becauſe thou ſeeſt it better ſo to do, and more good effects of it, than not to do it; not to thy ſelf only, but any where. Out of Charity, I ſay, in general to do more Good than thou ſeeſt Harm, let it light where it will, where ever thou ſeeſt it. Which part of Good effects may ſometimes be more particularly received to thy ſelf, as to expel thy too much Indifferency and Coldneſs to the Good or Hurt of others, to the love of Truth and Goodneſs, to uſe and exerciſe the good government and direction of thy Judgment, of which as a Superiour in ſome ſort thou mayeſt have more need, as of a neceſſary quality for thy place and duty, to imitate what's Good, ſhun what thou obſerveſt Bad in others, &c. Part of theſe good effects to the Perſon himſelf judged, to encourage him in any good Quality or Action, to check or reſtrain him from what's bad, to adviſe him of his Errour or Fault, which but by a diſcreet and ſeaſonable

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Judgment of him from ſome other Perſon he would not have taken notice of. Men would want conſiderable advantages to the knowledg and minding of their Faults and Duties, Perfections and Imperfections, if they were, and did what they liſted, and no body cared or dared to obſerve, and paſs their Judgments concerning them. It is better they ſhould know that others, and that wiſer than themſelves are Obſervers and Spectators. And laſtly, Part of them to others, to encourage them to follow or imitate if they be commended, or to reſtrain them from Imitation, or being drawn away, if we diſapprove and diſcommend. We may ſee it for the good of others oft frankly and chearfully to ſpeak well of, and commend in their hearing, and to reprove or diſallow according to the greatneſs of the Fault or Imperfection. And we may in ſome caſes think our ſelves reaſonably too cold and indifferent or dull in obſerving and ſaying nothing of what's Good or Bad in others. I ſay, let all our Judgments be with the fore-ſight

of, and being affected with all thoſe or the like Good effects, which we may ſee may follow. And then be ſure we may conclude, that ſuch Judging out of ſuch a Principle will pleaſe God too. And then you have all the particulars of your one general due End of all your Actions, *viz. The greateſt Good of the whole Univerſe.* Here therefore I exclude *ultimate* Self-love, that it be not to gratifie our ſelves only any of theſe ways before mention'd, by Activity, Curioſity, Hatred, Revenge, Anger, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flattery, *&c.*

I exclude alſo all Ill-will or Contempt againſt the Perſon, but only againſt the Vice and Imperfection of him; nay, I affirm we ought always to have a love of benevolence to the Perſon. The Charity I ſpeak of, muſt be an Univerſal and Unlimited one to the whole, and therefore muſt comprehend and take in every particular we ſee, and conſequently the Perſon himſelf guilty of any Fault or Imperfection. Now, becauſe

becauſe Men are oft apt to deceive themſelves and others by their confident pretences, ſome Signs when we do judg out of Charity, are theſe:

1. More readineſs and willingneſs to judg every where on the Good ſide than on the Bad. This is a ſign we would have no Evil in the World if we could, not without an abſolute neceſſity for a greater Good, and conſequently of a moſt unlimited and univerſal Charity.

2. An excuſing others, and ſaying all we can juſtly and truly for them, and that ſuch an Action, which oft proceeds from ſome bad Principle, it might in ſuch a Perſon proceed from Ignorance, he might be miſtaken, he might think ſo or ſo, or he might do it by Surprize, or the forces of Temptation, the Temptation might be ſtrong, and conſequently not argue a very ſmall degree of Goodneſs; and if it be in matter of Prudence, that the Perſon might conſider well, and otherwiſe than we do, or it may prove otherwiſe than we judg. In all which, as we are to ſhew

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our Charity thus by excuſing or leſſening what we ought; ſo we are too to ſhew it by a modeſt diſapprobation of what's Imperfect or Faulty in them ſometimes, and not through Idleneſs, Lazineſs, Coldneſs, or Flattery, and fear to Diſpleaſe for the preſent, betray the faulty Perſon, or others, into too good an Opinion of themſelves, and to be content willingly to be no better. This thus excuſing is a ſign, I ſay, that a Man would willingly have as little, and as few Faults in the World any where, as might be, and conſequently of a very univerſal Charity.

3. A third ſign is a frequent Judging of our ſelves, eſpecially on the worſt ſide; that is, obſerving and condemning our ſelves for our own Faults, and acknowledging our own Imperfections. The obſervation, judging and acknowledging our own Faults and Imperfections, doth not uſe (I ſpeak for the moſt part, theſe not being univerſal Signs) to proceed from any hatred of our ſelves, is very conſiſtent with mens love to themſelves; for we do not ſee

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men hate themſelves ſo forwardly; they love themſelves, and all they do moſtwhat proceeds therefrom. Wherefore it is more likely that ſuch perſons Judgments concerning others, might proceed from a love of the perſons judged too, and of others in general; they deal by them, as they deal by themſelves, and no worſe. But when we ſee men forward to obſerve and judg others, and never to mind themſelves, it is a ſign this proceeds from buſibodineſs, or curioſity, or ſome worſe Principle: For if it proceeded from any charity to the perſon, why ſhould they not be as kind to themſelves? Cannot they ſee it will do them as much good to judg themſelves, as it will do others to judg them? And ſo likewiſe, Is it likely Men ſhould ſee any more good come on't to the World to judg others, than to judg themſelves? Is it not rather ſuſpected, nay, manifeſt to Men, that there would be much better Conſequences, if Men more betook themſelves to obſerve and judg themſelves than others, at leaſt equal? If therefore it

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proceeds out of Charity to the World to obſerve and judg others, why ſhould not the ſame move us to do ſo by our ſelves?

4. A fourth ſign is, when our Judgment is paſſed with Calmneſs and Modeſty. Theſe are, firſt, Signs of the abſence of all bad and unallowable Principles, and therefore of the preſence of a Good one (for ſome there muſt be.) Calmneſs is a ſign of, or rather is the abſence of Paſſions, and more particularly of Anger, Revenge, Hatred, of our Activity, Curioſity, and Buſie-bodineſs, and conſequently of Raſhneſs, and other Prejudices. By Modeſty, I mean, a not *Inordinately*, and *Immoderately* affecting, nor aſſuming to ones ſelf any inſtances of his Perfection or Excellency, and among others, Superiority, great Merits, whether truly or falſly. This therefore where and when it is, is a ſign that the Perſon's judgment comes not from Imperiouſneſs, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, one kind of that (for the more we depreſs others, the more

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we make our ſelves ſuperiour to them) Contempt; nay, nor from flattery. For Fear, affectation of Friendſhip or Favour, is a thing that the modeſt Man is free from too. Now by how much theſe are ſigns of the abſence of our bad Principles, the ſeveral inſtances of Selfiſhneſs, ſo much are they the ſigns of the preſence of a good one (for ſome there is always) *viz.* of Charity.

Sect. II.

2. A ſecond general Rule, which hath been before mentioned in other places, is always to judg truly. Here I would have it ſet down as a ſhort Rule to be eaſily remembred, and always ready at hand: But becauſe I have already ſpoken ſo much of this, I ſhall now add no more.

Sect. III.

3. Have a care of all Paſſions, but eſpecially of Anger before Judgment. This hath been alſo mention'd before in

in the Means. Always judg before; and if the Caſe require it, that is, if there is no way of removing the Evil but by a deſire of inflicting another leſs, then let thy Anger follow a clear and calm Judgment: Some Reaſons in brief are, becauſe thou art in great danger of being prejudic'd, and that indiſcernably, to judg raſhly or falſly; and then thou doſt no good to the perſon judged, if he hear, or hear of thy Judgment. For he'l be prejudic'd againſt thy Jugdment, as being raſh, or coming from pride, or ill-will againſt him; wherefore he'l think he ought not, or on purpoſe, and out of diſpleaſure againſt thee, he will not believe what thou thinkeſt and ſayeſt concerning him; He will have no regard thereto. Nor will others be the better, for thou giveſt a bad example. Nor doſt thou inform them; for they will not truſt thy Judgment, nor take thy Word and Teſtimony then; they'l think thou art partial, not an upright Judg. I ſay, this will be, when they ſee thee judg with fierce paſſions without, and before any reaſon aſſigned. Other-

Otherwiſe, I confeſs, when a thing firſt calmly appears true, and of concernment to be judged and believed, and no other way will do but that way; then to appear warm, and not too indifferent.

Sect. IV.

4. Declare not thy Judgment, when thou thy ſelf art guilty. One reaſon is, becauſe that, as hath been before ſaid, the Perſon concern'd and others, will think it proceeds not from any Charity, but from Selfiſhneſs, Ill-will, Pride, and ſo conſequently they preſently flie out againſt thee, and are diſpleaſed at thee for that, and take no notice of thy Judgment, whether true or falſe. There paſſions are more moved with, and they more attend to the principle of thy Judgment, than the truth of it. The reaſon of which is again, that Men being *ultimate* Self-lovers, and Proud, would have reaſon to love themſelves as much as may be; whence they are more apt far preſently

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to take more notice of others Faults than their own; and consequently when any one passeth Judgment concerning them more presently to look at the fault, than the truth of his Judgment. This is the reason we see every one flie presently in the face of the guilty Judger, and ask him whether he be not as bad, and least of all bears his Judgment or Censure; *viz.* They think it here more than ordinarily manifest, that it proceeds not out of Love to them (for why then think they, should he not love himself as well); but out of Envy, Pride, or the like. Every Man will say to such a Man, *Physician heal thy self.* That he is an unskilful or unfaithful Physician, that hath some by-end, who goes about, or undertakes to cure that in another Man, which he cannot or will not in himself.

Clodius accusat Mœchos, Catilina Cethegum.

Let us see thee Mend thy self first, say they, and then we'll believe indeed, thou

thou ſeeſt reaſon to judg another for it, and mayſt do it out of Charity.

Sect. V.

5. Or if thou doſt judg when guilty, reſolve to be Innocent for the future, and condemn thy ſelf in the firſt place, becauſe more ready to take notice of thy own faults than of others. This will give Men more aſſurance of thy Circumſpection, and Wiſdom, and Charity, and conſequently make them more attend to thy Judgment, and believe it according to its Truth. When thou ſeeſt (for Example) any Perſon commit any thing which offends thee, and for which thou art ready to blame or reproach him, and heareſt others do ſo: Before thou paſſeſt thy Judgment, reflect upon thy ſelf ſincerely; ſay to thy ſelf, Am not I guilty of the ſame in ſome degree or other, and cannot or will not ſee that in my ſelf, which now I am about ſeverely to reprehend in another, and it may be deſervedly in reſpect of the Offender, only it would

come better out of my mouth, if I my ſelf were firſt Innocent or Penitent? Don't I ſee at leaſt a Beam in my Brother's eye, when I have as great an one or the ſame in my own? There are Five Reaſons among others, why a Man ſhould firſt or equally take notice of his own faults, accuſe and condemn himſelf.

1. Every Man ought to love himſelf ſure as well as his Neighbour, as he would do another Perſon of the ſame qualities; and if it be good his Neighbours faults ſhould be obſerved and judged, that he might be adviſed and amended, ſure it is good his own ſhould too.

2. A Man gives a very good Example to others, that they ſhould do ſo by themſelves too; which is a thing ſo very rare, and yet of ſuch extraordinary uſe and benefit.

3. He renders his own Judgment concerning others, when he doth paſs it, more effectual, by giving to underſtand it proceeds not from Imperiouſneſs, Domineering, Envy, Peeviſhneſs, or Buſiebodineſs, but from a wiſe Charity, out

out of a prudent Love, he doth by others as by himſelf, he ſpares not himſelf.

4. Every one knoweth moſt certainly the truth of his Judgment concerning himſelf.

5. Here Mens care and zeal will be more ſucceſsfully employed certainly; for every Man hath it more in his own power to mend and reform what he obſerves and condemns in himſelf, than what he condemns in others.

Sect. VI.

6. For the moſt part it is moſt ſafe, that is, of more certain good effect not to declare thy judgment than to do it. And therefore when at any time, or in any particular caſe thou ſeeſt no advantage of good conſequence or effects on either ſide to paſs Judgment or hold thy Tongue, rather chuſe to refrain; do it not till thou ſeeſt ſome conſiderable advantage. And one reaſon is, becauſe a Man may (for the moſt part I ſay) paſs his Judgment at another

time, may have opportunities enough to do it; but he cannot recal it when paſſed, he cannot undo what he hath done, *Neſcit vox miſſa reverti.* And yet the practice of Men is generally clean contrary; that is, if there be not ſomething to affright or deter them, they ſeldome refrain to ſpend their cenſures very freely.

Sect. VII.

7. Be more cautious and ſparing in ſometimes paſſing ſometimes declaring thy Judgment in theſe following Caſes.

(1.) Concerning thy Superiours, eſpecially on the worſt ſide; and that becauſe, 1. As to their Principles they being far from our Obſervation, and there being few or very uncertain ſigns thereof (for the moſt part) our Judgments here will be very uncertain. And

2. As to their actual prudence and fore-ſight in matters concerning their Office, it is for the ſame reaſon to us uncertain, but yet far more likely (to com-

compare it with that of their Inferiours or other private Perſons) to be more and better than what is in them. For they make it more their Buſineſs to attend to what is moſt for the general good of thoſe who are under their care, when Inferiours look only or principally at themſelves. And then they generally have better information what is ſo. And truly, it ſeems likely that if there were as much aſſurance of the Integrity of Governors, or their ſincere love to the publick Good, as there is of their knowledg, the Judgments of wiſe and honeſt Men would generally with reaſon be for their honour and advantage; though with raſh and proud Men, of which always are too many, the moſt manifeſt Integrity and Wiſdom will not be ſufficient to procure them Truth and Juſtice.

3. The contempt or undervaluing of them and their Authority (which follow upon our Judgment) is of much worſe effect than that of private Perſons, as generally Laws, publick Advices and Sentiments, and Examples

too ſometimes are of more uſe than private Opinions and Examples: They being, I ſay, generally better, of more comprehenſive and certain good effect, as done by a greater and more generous Charity, with more of a publick Spirit, and more Prudence and Wiſdom: Private Perſons, eſpecially ſtill the more Vulgar, are generally more Selfiſh and Fooliſh.

(2.) Be more ſparing in declaring thy Judgment concerning Friends. For if thy Judgment be on the good hand, it will be ſuſpected Flattery or generally Self-love. And therefore it is generally, when any one commends his Friend, allowed for him, nay, expected he ſhould interpoſe his excuſe, that it is ſaid by him who might be ſuſpected Partial, and more apt to ſpeak ſomewhat beyond the Truth. But if thy Judgment be on the worſt ſide, thou wilt be eſteemed Ungrateful, and were it never ſo true, yet it ſhould not have been ſaid by thee; and therefore in ſuch Caſes too we ſee Men Apologize and make an Excuſe, and alledg ſome more than

than ordinary reaſon, that obligeth them to paſs ſuch a Judgment on their very Friend.

(3.) Be more ſparing in doing it of thine Enemy: the reaſon is, becauſe thy Judgment will be ſuſpected and believed to proceed from Hatred and Ill-will; I ſay, be more ſparing and cautious in theſe, and ſuch like Caſes. I do not ſay, but that ſometimes there may be ſufficient reaſons to do it; but then there is more than ordinary Prudence to be uſed in ſuch manner as I have now Inſtanc'd, to prevent or remove the hinderance of its good effect.

Nay, I adviſe rather to take occaſion to paſs thy Judgment on the good ſide here; that is, to commend him and ſpeak well of him for what thou knoweſt good and commendable in him; for then thy Judgment is believed, and conſequently of better effect to thoſe who hear it for encouragement to Imitation. Thou giveſt alſo a good Example to others of thy Unprejudicedneſs, and being above and untoucht by buſie Paſſions of Hatred, Ill-will, or Revenge,

and of being ſuch a generous lover of Truth and Goodneſs, as not to conceal, but willingly take notice of, and approve what is really in the Perſon laudable, though thine Adverſary, it may be too altogether undeſerved and without reaſon.

And laſtly too, By this exerciſe and uſe thou really doſt procure and confirm in thy ſelf this Generoſity, and Manlineſs, and Chriſtianneſs (for nothing more commended in Chriſtian Religion) of Temper, and ſubdueſt Selfiſhneſs and the rabble of it's Slaves, thoſe *inordinate and immoderate Appetites and Paſſions*, makeſt them ſneak and dare not to appear.

(4.) Be more ſparing and cautious in declaring thy Judgment concerning a Perſon generally Innocent or well Diſpoſed, but once or rarely overtaken; and that becauſe it is moſt likely that he will do ſo no more, or mend without thy judging him to himſelf or others. Nor is there much danger of others imitating him in one ſingle or very rare Action, when they know he gene-

generally doth the contrary; (only indeed if one ſhould obſerve it who knows not the Man, he may be informed that the Man was ſurprized and uſeth not ſo to do) and then what needed the trouble or ſhame or diſcredit that thou gaveſt him, it was unneceſſary: *And no evil of Pain or Puniſhment muſt be admitted, but where it is neceſſary for a greater good.* And then it is an uſual ſign to others of ſome ill nature and Pride, that is pleaſed too much in others Faults or Infirmities; when Men are ſo ready to judg the firſt; and conſequently is of bad Example to them, and prejudicial to ones ſelf. Or if thou doſt ſee reaſon to take notice of ſuch Fault or Infirmity, let it be very ſhortly, and preſently ſeconded with a Commendation of him for his general paſt Innocency or freedom there-from; and that thou doubteſt not but that he himſelf the moſt diſapproves of it, and will not readily do ſo again. All which are ſigns of freedom from any Selfiſhneſs, of Charity and Prudence, and conſequently the more likely to have

good

good effect on the Perſon concern'd, and others too.

(5.) Be ſparing in declaring thy Judgment of wrathful and baſhful Perſons, either to themſelves or others. One reaſon is, becauſe the wrathful and angry Man will not and cannot bear it through Pride, and the baſhful through Shame, that is, Fear. To the wrathful Man it is at leaſt to himſelf ineffectual; for he'll the more juſtifie or defend himſelf, and do or be the ſame thing again out of Revenge and Pride; it will give him occaſion of wrath and attempting Miſchief; he'll *turn and rent thee*. I ſay, this for the moſt part (as all other Directions of this kind): For ſometimes it may be requiſite for his and others Good, firſt calmly and ſoftly (ſigns of Good-will to him by doing him good) afterwards ſhortly and ſmartly (that is, out of real Benevolence ſtill, but by ſome pain or evil to him) to paſs Judgment concerning any Principle or Action of his, let him take it how he will, and but too impatiently.

And as for the baſhful Perſon, it is too

too great a puniſhment for him; leſs would have done: And always *do as little evil as thou canſt:* A private Hint to him would have been ſufficient. *Be not a Witneſs againſt thy Neighbour without a cauſe, and deceive not with thy Lips,* ſaith the Wiſeman, *Prov.* 24. 28. That is, Do not paſs nor make known thy Judgment either privately or publickly, without ſufficient reaſon.

(6.) Be ſparing in declaring thy Judgment on the worſt ſide before much Company; eſpecially Perſons whoſe Favour or good Opinion is more conſiderable, and who are in no great danger of Imitation.

One reaſon is, becauſe moſt-what leſs Diſcredit or Diſgrace would have ſufficed to the Mending or Correcting of the Perſon; if it had been before but one or two, either before the Perſon himſelf concern'd, or from whom it might have been conveyed to him. The Faults or Imperfections had need be great or frequent, and the Perſon or Perſons very confident and preſumptuous, obſtinate and conceited, and a danger

danger of ſome general Infection, when they are ſo much publiſhed and made known.

(7.) Be ſparing in declaring thy Judgment on the worſt ſide before Enemies, or Adverſaries, or ill-diſpoſed.

One reaſon is, becauſe they are, or are in danger of being prejudiced and partial in their Judgments, concerning the Perſon to whom they are ill-affected already; and thou by thy Judgment confirmeſt and increaſeſt this their Partiality. They are but too ready to catch at and take notice of any thing ſpoken diſadvantagiouſly, and to add to it too and aggravate it; and thou art not to give them the occaſion if there be no greater good to be had thereby, not with a leſs Inconveniency to be procur'd. Thoſe too that are of an ill Temper, and apt to be Envious and Proud, will make ill uſe thereof, and gratifie and augment thoſe Vices in themſelves, and afterwards be generally contemptuous and ill-affected towards the Perſon thou diſcommendeſt. It is more ſafely done, and very profitably

bly oft-times before Perſons of a benign and generous Temper, and thoſe who are Diſcreet, who make from thence profitable Obſervation of the Cauſes the miſchievous Effects of the Defects, Infirmities, Faults and Vices of Humane Nature, to Direct, Govern, and Moderate themſelves, to Adviſe and Counſel others with Reaſon, and even the Perſon himſelf whoſe faults are noted, if it comes fairly in their way: Not to contemn or diſpiſe the Perſon in general, much leſs to hate him. Sometimes this may be done unawares, but oft-times it proceeds from an ill will to the Perſon judged; and therefore from an intent and deſign to exaſperate and incenſe his Adverſaries againſt him more; knowing they are apt eaſily to take fire. Oft-times it comes more from Flattery, to pick Thanks and ingratiate ones-ſelf with him who is enemy to the Perſon judged, whom they judg they pleaſe hereby, being willing to hear of the others Faults and Infirmities, to gratifie his Hatred or Pride, or that he may have wherewithal to

juſtifie his being ſo diſpos'd againſt him, that he might ſeem to be his Enemy with more Reaſon. If it be not thus, yet oft-times this will be ſuſpected; a Man will incur the ſuſpicion of an ungenerous Revenge, or Hatred, or Ill-will, or Flattery, or at leaſt the accuſation of Imprudence.

That's the *7th* Rule, Be more ſparing in thy Judgment, 1. Concerning Superiors. 2. Friends. 3. Enemies. 4. Once or rarely Surprized. 5. To and of wrathful and baſhful Perſons. 6. Before much Company. 7. Before Enemies or Ill-diſpos'd.

Sect. VIII.

8. Be apt and inclin'd rather to defer thy Judgment concerning others till thou art deſired; and that either by the Perſon himſelf, or others who may be much neceſſarily concern'd to know another Perſons Qualities or Conditions; and then not to refuſe it. Some Reaſons are, becauſe that hereby thou accuſtomeſt and uſeſt thy ſelf to Self-govern-

vernment and Direction, to Act for certain Ends, and by certain Rules, particularly thou cauſeſt thy ſelf to refrain thy ſelf, and to be free and averſe from Buſie-bodineſs, and impertinent and profitable medling with other Mens Matters, and other bad Principles of Judgment, partly by meer diſuſe, partly by attending to this Rule, and the good effects of it: Again, thy Judgment is then more likely to be true. Further, Thou ſecureſt thy ſelf alſo from ſuſpicion of Prejudice, and conſequently thy Judgment is more heeded, and it being more likely to be true, may be of good uſe to the Perſon deſiring, and the other concerning whom it is deſired if known, to adviſe and forewarn them of ſome Fault or Imperfection to be reformed or get rid of, which otherwiſe would not have been minded or believed. Further, Thou doeſt a very good turn for, and gratifieſt him that inquires of thee. It may be alſo an occaſion of a good Turn and of a Kindneſs to the other Perſon thou paſſeſt thy Judgment of, to remove ſome unjuſt

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Suſpicions or Opinions concerning him. It may be he was believed or ſuſpected worſe than he was. Thou mayſt rectifie ſome Miſtakes.

Sect. IX.

9. Thou mayſt then more freely and frequently declare thy Judgment concerning one to another, or to more; when thou ſeeſt them deficient in Ability or Wiſdom, to take care of themſelves; and particularly when they are actually Ignorant of ſomething in another Perſon, which may be of great concernment to them; or are deceived in their Opinion concerning him, whence ſome great Detriment or Dammage may ariſe from one to the other.

Thus for Example: If a Man knows or reaſonably ſuſpects a Man to be Falſe and Faithleſs, to be Fraudulent, or to be Poor and Inſufficient, who yet would be bargaining with, or borrowing of another, or getting ſome intereſt in his Perſon or Eſtate, of which he may be

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Ignorant; or to perſwade to ſome Actions and Opinions which may be childiſh, fooliſh, or hurtful; a Man may adviſe the Perſons concerned, and give them his Judgment then unasked, not out out of any Ill-will to the one; but of Good-will to and Care of the other: *For a Man ought to be a Friend to every Man, and a Brother*, and not permit if he can any one to be dammaged or miſchieved, and to keep him from the commiſſion of a Sin. A Man may oft-times meet with Perſons in the World who are innocent too and ſimple, of no great prudence and foreſight, who are alſo raſh and precipitate, or dull and inapprehenſive, who therefore may be eaſily impos'd upon by others, and made a Prey of by them. Here it is a prudent piece of Charity to adviſe and fore-warn and to diſcover the Deſigns and Qualities of thoſe who would and do abuſe their Simplicity, and imprudent well-meaning Honeſty.

Some Reaſons of this are the ſame with the former. It is an exerciſe of

Virtue and Prudence in our ſelves. It is an act of more than ordinary Charity to the Perſon in danger to be deceived, to lend him thus the uſe of thine Eyes for his ſafety and good. It is a very ſeaſonable making uſe of thy Judging; that is, it will do moſt good now, when at another time perhaps it would do none at all, or not ſo much. Here in this caſe when a Man deſires thy Opinion or Judgment, thou removeſt his Solicitude, and ſatisfieſt him perhaps, if he be Ignorant thou informeſt him; whereas if thou giveſt thy Judgment unasked, before thou art deſired, and where the Man is ſufficient himſelf, thou wilt do them no kindneſs, nor will they ſo much mind thee, nor thank thee for it; for it may be they have none, or not ſuch need of thy Judgment juſt then; and thou wilt be more ſuſpected too of Buſie-bodineſs or Ill-will. So alſo where thou art not deſired by one Perſon to give thy Judgment concerning another Perſon, but unasked becauſe of the Perſons Inſufficiency, out of Cha-

Charity thou doeſt it, the effects moſt-what are very good, and if therefore thou doeſt it, thou art no leſs prudent than charitable. And theſe are the moſt conſiderable Rules I have now thought of, for the Mannagement and Government of our ſelves in judging others; which in very few words for Memory ſake, I will reckon up again.

1. Be ſure it be never inconſiſtent with Charity, but always done out of the proſpect of ſome good end.

2. With the exacteſt truth.

3. Beware of all Paſſions before Judgment.

4. Declare not thy Judgment when thou thy ſelf art guilty. Or

5. If thou doſt, firſt accuſe and condemn thy ſelf.

6. It is better and ſafer generally, not to declare thy Judgment of Perſons.

7. Be ſparing in judging and declaring thy Judgment on the worſt ſide concerning Superiors, Friends, Enemies, Surprized, Wrathful and Baſhful Perſons, before much Company,

before Enemies and Ill-diſpoſed.

8. Defer thy Judging much, till thou art deſired or asked.

9. Interpoſe it to them whom thou ſeeſt defective in their Ability or Care for themſelves. Many more by Experience may be taken notice of and obſerved.

Sect. X.

10. I have nothing more to do in this Argument now, but only to remind you of the two general things I intended and aimed at in this Diſcourſe principally to recommend to you, and that is *Charity and Prudence*, in a buſineſs that is very frequent, and takes up a very conſiderable part of our Lives. For it is very obvious and eaſie to obſerve, that a great part of our Actions of Life, are the thinking and judging, and talking and diſcourſing of other Perſons, their Qualities and Actions. The *Charity* is in the laſt of the ſix Particulars. The contrary of

of which I here think principally prohibited, which was to judg out of any *ultimate* Selfiſhneſs, and therefore not out of Buſi-bodineſs, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, or the like. But if this bad Principle be prohibited, than if ever Judging be permitted in any Caſe (as ſure it is) the contrary of Charity is commanded; for one of thoſe Ends and Principles muſt be our *Prudence*, is concern'd in the other five prohibited Judgments, *viz.* to be too prone to judg in general, to be too much inclined to judg on the worſt ſide, to judg raſhly, to judge falſly, to be too forward in declaring our Judgments. All the Cauſes, Conſequences, Remedies and Rules I have mention'd, are but more particulary Motives and Incentives to our Charity, or Directions for our Prudence. And now therefore I heartily exhort you to the Practice of what hath been ſpoken. That you would adorn this part of your Converſation with the two moſt excellent

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Ornaments, not only of our Souls, but of the Divine Nature it ſelf. For our Charity and Prudence are but little imitations of God's infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs. How beautiful, lovely, and pleaſant a thing it is to ſee each one diſcreetly tender of his Neighbours good Name, Reputation, Intereſt, or Concern? How lovely a thing is generous Love? And what a reverend thing is unaffected Prudence in all our Converſation, and particularly here? What unhandſome things are Raſhneſs and Falſhood? How ugly and contemptible Selfiſhneſs, Hatred, Malice, Pride, Envy, Contemptuouſneſs, unguided Anger, Buſie-bodineſs, vain Curioſity, Flattery? *&c.*

Finally, remember we are Chriſtians, and who it is, *viz.* Our Maſter and Saviour Himſelf, who hath here expreſly forbidden theſe things (*Judg not that ye be not judged*). The ſame our Maſter and Saviour

viour ſend down His gracious Influence to help us, to do what He hath taught and commanded us, *Amen*.

FINIS.